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This dissertation explores how the Internet changes the concept of political power. It 
focuses on information as a source of political power, and the relationship between 
information and power. As a conceptual analysis of the impact of the In ernet on 
political power shift, it argues that the Internet transforms the concept of power from 
hard to soft. This dissertation argues: (i) the Internet changes power sources from 
material, such as military or economic, to non-material, such as information or 
policies; (ii) the Internet promotes the rise of soft power in international relations. 
This dissertation aims to improve theoretical as well as empirical understanding of 
information as a source of political power, and to conceptualize political power from 
hard to soft. According to Nye, soft power is defined as “the ability to get what you 
want through attraction rather than coercion.” This study begins with an analysis of 
the concept of power in politics, and continues to analyze the impact of the Internet 
 
on the conceptualization of political power. This dissertation examines the Internet as 
a new form of communication media with particular emphasis on the political use of 
the Internet. Then, it explores digital divide, and discusses some implications of the 
changed concept of power for two Koreas and the U.S.
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
“Is it better to be loved more than feared, or feared more than loved?” In the 
Prince, Niccolo Machiavelli wrote that “one ought to be both feared and loved, 
but as it is difficult for the two to coincide, it is much safer to be feared than 
loved.”1 Joseph Nye asks a similar question, and answers that successful states 
need not only hard and soft power, but they must also wield “smart power,” which 
he defines as the strategic combination of hard and soft power.2 
This dissertation is on the power of information. In a broad sense, it explores the 
impact of the Internet on global politics. How does the Internet change global 
politics? How does the Internet change political power in international relations? 
How does information, made available through the Internet beyond borders, 
impact politics both on the level of actors and issue areas? What does he Internet 
change, and what does it not change in international relations? 
More specifically, this dissertation argues that the information provided by the 
Internet brings  three expansions in global politics: first, the concept of political 
                                                
1 Niccolo Machiavelli 1950. The Prince and the Discourses, Translated by Luigi Ricci, Revised by 
E.R.P. Vincent, Introduction by Max Lerner, New York, N.Y.: Random House p. 61. 
2 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 2004. Soft Power: the means to success in world politics, New York, N.Y.: 
Public Affairs. p. 32. 
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power from hard to soft; second, actors from national to transnational; third, issue 
areas from offline to online. The Internet has broadened the spectrum of power 
from hard to soft, and the spectrum of actors from national to transnational, and 
the spectrum of issue areas from offline to online. 
It is interesting that each of these three expansions is interactive: soft power 
interacts with hard power; transnational actors interact with na ional actors; cyber 
politics interacts with real politics. The Internet does not stay as virtual reality 
inside the computer. It actively works beyond cyberspace and influences the real 
world we live in. 
This dissertation proposes that information is power. In other words, information 
can turn into political, socio-economic or cultural power. This is an attempt to 
show how information via the Internet can be the source of political power, and 
why it matters in global politics. From individual to social or t  national, the 
people or the nations or the organizations which has the information have a 
power. The Internet is a new media that can produce both hard and soft power. 
This dissertation argues that the Internet changed the major locus of power from 
hard to soft. 
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Everything changes except the fact that everything changes. Indeed, the world 
always has been in a state of change, and our views of it also change when 
existing theories do not explain the change. The Internet is a new media that is 
essential in almost every aspect of social, economic, and political life. In 
international relations, there is a general agreement that the In ernet has been 
changing the dynamic of global politics, however, there is no agreement as to 
what extent and how the Internet has been changing it. To address this gap, this 
dissertation proposes a study on the impact of the Internet on political power and 
the rise of soft power. 
While most of international relations studies have focused on the rise and fall of 
economic or military power, this dissertation is interested in exploring the less 
studied, the other face of power, what is called “soft power.” Thisdis ertation 
examines how the Internet is changing the dynamics of global politics by 
evaluating a classic notion of the traditional concept of power, and by offering a 
new concept of political power. 
Research Questions 
What is the impact of the Internet as a new media on global politics? How does 
the Internet change the concept of political power? How does information impact 
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politics both in the level of actors, and the level of issue areas? What is the 
relationship between hard and soft power? How does information turn into a 
source of political power? 
This dissertation argues that the impact of the Internet brought three major 
changes in global politics: first, the concept of political power from hard to soft; 
second, actors from national to transnational; third, issue areas from offline to 
online. The Internet changes power sources from material resources su h as 
military or economic to non-material informational resources. Therefore, the 
Internet promotes the rise of soft power in international relations. This dissertation 
argues that the impact of the Internet expands the concept of political power from 
hard to soft, and analyzes how soft power interacts with hard power. 
These arguments are seen as important but a systematic study is not completed 
yet. Nye argues that economic power is not a form of soft power, while this 
dissertation argues that economic power can be converted into both soft power
and hard power. Economic power can be soft or hard depending on which 
approach is used. For example, when economic power is used to buy weapons, it 
reflects a hard power approach, but when used to provide humanitarian relief or 
assistance, it is using a soft power approach. 
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The objective of this dissertation is mainly conceptual. This dissertation tries to 
make both theoretical and empirical connections between the concept of soft 
power and the reality of global politics. This dissertation aims to analyze the 
changing scope of political power. Three objectives are presented as follows; i) to 
improve theoretical understanding of information as a source of political power in 
international relations; ii) to demonstrate the expansion of the concept of political 
power from hard to soft; iii) to show the change of actors from natio l to 
transnational, and the change of the issue areas from offline to online. 
 Figure 1.1 Conceptual Framework for Power 
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The framework of this dissertation considers the Internet as a new political 
communication media, and that it makes information a source of political power, 
thus, changing the concept of political power. Figure 1.1 shows the conceptual 
framework for power. 
More specifically, this dissertation focuses on (i) the Internet as a new media, 
while it acknowledges traditional media such as television, radio, and newspaper 
as still powerful and reliable; (ii) the political impact of the Internet among 
various social, economic, and cultural ones; (iii) soft power, while it 
acknowledges hard power still matters. 
Literature Review 
This dissertation is based on international relations literatures, and political 
communication literatures exploring media and politics. In the study of the 
Internet and politics, some believe the Internet changes everything w ile others 
believe the Internet changes almost nothing. There is validity to both sides. New 
identities and communities are formed in cyberspace, and more informati n is 
available, but governments continue to use military resources and economi  
influence to control others. This dissertation assumes both sides are valid, but tries 
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to understand and analyze how the main locus of the power resources has changed 
from material to immaterial. 
International politics is understood through three competing paradigms of 
international relations theory: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. As the 
dominant theoretical tradition throughout the Cold War, realism approaches 
international relations as a struggle for power among nations. Realism sees states 
as major actors in international politics. It offers simple and powerful 
explanations for international phenomena such as power, conflict, war, and 
obstacles to cooperation. The general prospectus of realism on international 
relations is quite pessimistic. 
Hans J. Morgenthau, as a classic realist, focused on the nature of states. He 
believed that states, like humans, have a natural desire to dominate others. The 
ability to dominate others has traditionally been related to the possession of 
certain material capabilities, largely military or economic resources. This 
traditional concept of power is known as hard power. By contrast, Kenneth Waltz, 
as a neo realist, focused on the nature of the system. He focused on the influence 
of the international system beyond human nature. For him, the system is anarchic. 
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Overall, liberalism has a more optimistic view on international relations than 
realism. Countrary to realists, Robert Keohane, from the school of neoliberal 
institutionalism, approaches international politics with an emphasis on the role of 
institutions and information. Liberal theorists believe that the spread of 
democracy, global economic ties, and international organizations will promote 
peace in international relations. Liberals generally see stats as central actors but 
some liberals provided new ideas about major actors, such as multi-national 
corporations and non-governmental organizations.  
Whereas realism and liberalism tend to focus on material factors, constructivist 
approaches emphasize the impact of ideas. In addition, realism and liberalism do 
not fully explain big changes in international politics of the post-Cold War era. 
Constructivism views international politics as shaped by ideas, values, culture, 
and social identities. Instead of taking the state as given in the system, 
constructivists regard the interests and identities of states s a continuously 
evolving process through shared beliefs, interests, and norms. Alexander Wendt 
argued that state identities and interests are “socially constructed by 
knowledgeable practice” and presented the issue of how identity and interests are 
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formed.3 Constructivism is inevitably attentive to the sources of change, and this 
dissertation stands within the constructivists’ theoretical framework, and shares 
the constructivist perspective. 
Change in communication technology and information flow beyond national 
boundaries result in significant political transformation. If we accept that 
information is a source of power, then understanding how it is used, distributed, 
and interpreted is an essential aspect of understanding politics.4 
There are tendencies for realists to argue in favor of hard power and liberals to 
emphasize the importance of soft power. Hard power is generally related to the 
realist perspective of international relations theory that mainly argues power 
comes from military and economic resources. The realist perspective of power 
began with Morgenthau who placed the concept of power at the centr of 
international relations studies.5 As Morgenthau offered, traditional realist theories 
of international relations rely on a power as a material resource, such as 
                                                
3 Wendt, 1992. “Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics.” 
International Organization. Vol. 46. No. 2 pp. 391-425. 
4 J.P. Singh 2002. “Introduction: Information Technologies and the Changing Scope of Global 
Power and Governance.” in James N. Rosenau and J.P. Singh, ed., Information Technologies and 
Global Politics: The Changing Scope of Power and Governance. Albany: State University of New 
York Press. pp. 1-38. 
5 For traditional power concept, see Chapter 9 in Hans J. Morgenthau, 1966. Politics Among 
Nations:  The Struggle for Power and Peace, N w York: Alfred A. Knopf 
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population, military forces, economic size and natural resources.6  Traditional 
approaches to the study of power have emphasized its more coercive and 
dominating aspects than attractive aspects. 
From the liberal perspective, Joseph Nye has contributed to develop the soft 
power concept, which countered the perception that military power was almost 
everything. He presents that economic and military power is linked to hard power 
while soft power is found in the realm of attraction usually coming from culture, 
education, information technology, or mass media. In summary, Nye’s concept is 
the power of “attraction,” as opposed to the power of “coercion”. This dissertation 
primarily focuses on the sources of soft power; however, it does not dey th  role 
of hard power sources. 
According to Jeffrey Hart, there are three different ways of observing power: (i) 
power as a resource, (ii) power as a relationship, (iii) power as a structure.7 
Toffler argues that the form of power shifts from one major kind to another—
from violence to wealth to knowledge.8 The point here is that the nature of power 
                                                
6 Morgenthau, 1966. 
7 Jeffrey Hart 1976. “Three Approaches to the Measurement of Power in International Relations.” 
International Organizations, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp.281-305. 
8 Alvin Toffler 1990. Powershift: Knowledge, Wealth, and Violence at the Edge of the 21st century. 
New York: Bantam Books. 
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is currently undergoing a shift. Table 1.1 shows leading states and major power 
resources from 1500s to 1900s. 
 
Table 1.1 Leading States and Major Power Resources, 1500s~1900s 
Period Leading State Major Resources 
16th century Spain Gold bullion, colonial trade, mercenary armies, dynastic ties 
17th century Netherlands Trade, capital markets, navy 
18th century France Population, rural industry, public administration, army 
19th century Britain Industry, political cohesion, finance and credit, navy, liberal 
norms, island location (easy to defend) 
20th century United States Economic scale, scientific and technical le dership, 
universalistic culture, military forces and alliances, liberal 
international regimes, hub of transnational communications 
Source: Nye, 1990. p.34 
Nye’s analysis has served as a basis for many scholars attempting to analyze the 
relationship between communication technology and its effects on politics. 
According to Nye, “power is the ability to achieve one’s purposes or goals,”9 and 
there are three ways to do this: coercion (sticks), inducement (carrots), and 
attraction (soft power).10 Nye argues that a country’s soft power can come from 
                                                
9 Nye 1990. p.25. 
10 Nye 2004. pp. i-xiii. 
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three resources: its culture, its political values, and its foreign policies.11 He 
further argues that it is a mistake to rely on hard or soft power alone, and suggests 
that the ability to combine them effectively is termed “smart power.”12 In the 
following chapter, Nye’s soft power will be examined further. 
J.P. Singh has offered an important way of analyzing the changing scope of power 
into three types: instrumental, structural, and meta-power.13 According to Singh, 
instrumental power focuses on the capability of power holders to produce a 
particular outcome, and structural power is about the ability to change d create 
institutions and rules.14 Thus, the conceptualization of the impact of the Internet 
on power employs some notions of the changing instrumental power. In 
international relations theory, we can find the formulations of structural power in 
the works by Waltz, and Cox.15 
Meta-power is the strongest type of transformative power, and refers to interactiv  
networking that “reconfigures, constitute, or reconstitute identitis, interests, and 
                                                
11 Nye 2004. pp.1-32 
12 Nye 2004. p.32 
13 Singh 2002. pp. 1-38. 
14 Singh 2002. pp. 1-38. 
15 Kenneth Waltz 1979. Theories of International Politics. New York: McGraw Hill; Robert W. 
Cox 1987. Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History. New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
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institutions.”16 From the perspective of meta-power, the nature of power as well 
as actors and issues also change. This type of power is related to soft power, and 
conceptually benefits from constructivism proposed by Wendt17. 
The literatures devoted to global communication is extensive. But few studies 
consider the impact of media on political power because much of the literature 
has been written by scholars of journalism. Political communications theorists 
contributed to research on the media’s role in politics in general. Thus, 
insufficient emphasis is often awarded to political factors such as power. From the 
communication medium theory, the impact of the Internet on power is not fully 
analyzed to a significant degree, particularly at the internaio l level, thus, its 
systemic study is not completed yet. 
Medium theory was first presented by Harold Innis, popularized by Marshall 
McLuhan.18 According to medium theory, each mode of communication has 
unique properties, and it affects the production and distribution of the 
communicated information. Based on communication medium theories, the 
                                                
16 Singh 2002. p. 13. 
17 Alexander Wendt 1992. “Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics.” International Organization. Vol. 46. No. 2 pp. 391-425. 
18 Harold Innis 1950. Empire and Communications. Oxford: Claredon Press; Marshall McLuhan 
1964. Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
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distribution of political power in the world order can be analyzed, and the effects 
brought by changing modes of communication on the way of social evolution can 
be presented.19  
Contending literatures have emerged to explain how new communication media 
affects power. Each perspective offers some insight; however, it does not 
adequately provide a complete understanding of the changes. Focusing on the 
technology alone looks at only a single aspect in a complex, and co stantly 
changing reality. 
The majority of works devoted to the study of the Internet and the implementation 
of new media and communication technologies have often focused on the utopian 
effects of the Internet. Many scholars hope that the development of 
communications technologies and expanded information processing can empower 
individuals and groups regardless of geographic location, and promote 
cooperation in international politics. But that is far from what is happening in 
reality. While the Internet has the ability to encourage cooperation and 
understanding, and promote peace, it also can be a tool to make conflict, terror, 
                                                
19 Ronald J. Deibert 1997. Parchment, Printing, and Hypermedia: Communication in World Order 
Transformation. New York: Columbia University Press. 
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and war. There has to be significant analysis of the Interne  influence on political 
power; however, it may be too early to assess the long term impact of the Internet 
as new communication media. 
When scholars assess the potential of the Internet to change global politics, it is 
dangerous to uncritically accept the assumptions of technological determinism 
focused on the Internet’s ability to affect world change. Since information 
communication media such as the Internet is embedded in our social, economi , 
political, and cultural systems, it inevitably reflects them. Therefore, in order to 
generate a new and better understanding of the effect of the Internet on political 
power, it is necessary to undertake a comprehensive study that considers various 
characteristics of the Internet impact. 
Methodological Issues 
This dissertation is concerned with the relationship between information and 
power. I argue that information interacts with power: power enables actors to 
acquire information, and information helps actors to define objectives, and 
ultimately to get what they want. Information is a flexible resource of power 
beyond time and space unlike any other power resource. This dissertat on 
analyzes the impact of the Internet on the conceptualization of power, and argues 
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that the Internet expands the concept of political power from hard to soft. It is a 
conceptual analysis of the role of information as a source of political power in 
international relations. 
This dissertation acknowledges that soft power doesn’t quantify neatly unlike 
hard power. Quantifying hard power, such as population, territory, raw material, 
or military forces is much easier than quantifying soft power, such as culture, 
ideology, information, communication technology. While hard power can be 
easily defined or measured, soft power is relatively difficult to define or measure 
— one way to quantify the source of soft power can be the use of public opinion 
polls changing over time. In the real world, it is sometimes difficult to clearly 
distinguish soft power from hard power, and whether a part of an eco omic 
relationship is a source of hard power or soft power. This is becaus hard power 
and soft power are not mutually exclusive. 
It is important to acknowledge that the approach of this dissertation is mainly 
conceptual, which raises two significant methodological challenges. First, there 
has been little agreement on the methodological process of analyzing political 
power, mostly due to the difficulties of power itself as a unit of analysis. Second, 
methodological problems in analyzing power have been particularly difficult 
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because there has been a lack of clarity over what areas of politics need to be 
examined. 
Therefore, there are two limitations in this dissertation. First, the definition of soft 
power appears less concrete, less measurable, and less predictabl. Second, the 
boundary of each power resource is not clear because they are interactive. Despite 
these limitations, this dissertation is important for the study of conceptualization 
of power in international relations. I hope to make a contribution to the existing 
literature as well as to future studies. 
Chapter plan 
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 1 introduces the research 
design, which includes research questions, hypothesis, and literature review. The 
purpose and importance of the study, and methodological issues, in addition to the 
chapter plan will also be presented in this chapter. 
The theoretical foundation of this dissertation will be provided in Chapter 2. This 
chapter examines the conceptualization of power and Nye’s soft power. It will 
explore the source of political power and its change from three diff rent 
approaches: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. Chapter 2 focuses on the 
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change in the main locus of political power from hard to soft, and on the rise of 
the soft power in international relations. In this chapter, the relationship between 
soft power and hard power will also be examined. 
Chapter 3 will present the examination of the Internet as a new media, and what is 
really new about the Internet. This section will address two confronting 
perspectives toward the nature of the Internet. Some scholars describe the Internet 
as borderless or decentralized with low cost, while others argues that this 
misrepresents the real and serious limits still inherent to the Internet. 
Chapter 4 will take a close look at the Internet as a new form of communication 
media with particular emphasis on the political use of the Internet. This chapter 
will show the Internet as a political media from national, regional, and global 
levels of analysis. Cyber politics in 2002 South Korean presidential election, soft 
power in East Asia, and transnational online activism will be explored. 
Chapter 5 will focus on the perceived gap between those who have accessto the 
Internet and those who do not.20 How should the Internet change to close this 
gap? What does the Internet need to change? From a global perspective, 
                                                
20 “There are only two kinds of people in the world, my old grandmother used to say, the haves 




information inequality between the haves and have-nots continues to exis and 
equal opportunity to information is still needed. 
Chapter 6 provides what the Internet does not or cannot change, North Korea, and 
implications for the two Koreas and U.S. policy. Soft power is related to Kim, 
Dae-Jung’s “Sunshine policy,” which means active engagement of North K rea. 
It is based on Aesop’s fable of the wind and the sun, where sunshine induces 
positive development better than winds. This chapter will show why soft power 
matters, and how it works for the two Koreas and the U.S. Lastly, conclusion will 
offer summaries and some concluding thoughts of the dissertation. 
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This dissertation has a view on history evolution as shown in Figure 1.2. How 
does human history evolve? Human history evolves with ups and downs. There is 
a time it rises (A) or falls (C), however, it does not stay the same (B). Overall, 
history has an upper right direction, and inside of it, there are never-ending ups 
and downs like (D). The great scientific breakthroughs, such as the information 
revolution and industrial revolution, point upwards, while great economic 








Chapter 2.  Power 
This chapter aims to explore the nature of power and the sources of power to gain 
a better understanding of political power and its concept. The concept of power is 
essential to understand politics, since political systems can be explained through 
the underlying distribution of power. 
Before exploring Nye’s soft power theory, it is necessary to ask the most 
important question in power analysis. What is power? “Power in international 
politics is like weather. Everyone talks about it, but few understand it….Power, 
like love, is easier to experience than to define or measure.”21 As a general 
definition in political science, Robert Dahl has defined basic concept of power, “A 
has power over B to the extent that A can get B to do what B otherwise would not 
do.”22 
Politics, whether national or international, involves power. From different 
perspectives, with varying degrees, international theorists have questioned what 
power is, and argued what the sources of power are and how they are changing 
                                                
21 In Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 1990. Bound to lead: the changing nature of American Power, New York: 
Basic Books, p. 25. 
22 Robert A. Dahl. 1957. “The Concept of Power” Behavioral Science Vol.2. No. 3 pp.201-215. 
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from military resources to economic resources to information resou ces. 
Regarding power, a basic distinction can be made between resource p wer—the 
possession of certain resources, and behavioral power—the ability to obtain 
outcomes you want. 
This chapter examines the conceptualization of power from classical political 
theory to international relations theory, and Joseph Nye’s soft power. It explores 
the source of political power and its change. It focuses on the change in the main 
locus of political power from hard to soft, and on the rise of the soft power in 
international relations. 
Conceptualization of Power 
Niccoló Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes are two great political thinkers in 
classical realist political theory. Regarding the nature and the concept of power, 
this chapter explores Hobbesian power first in detail for a better understanding of 
the three major approaches in international relations theory. 
In Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes says all of mankind has a general inclination for a 
perpetual and restless desire of power that ceases only in death.23 Hobbes’s 
                                                
23 Thomas Hobbes (1651)1962. Leviathan: or the matter, forme and power of a commonwealth 
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understanding of power is zero-sum in the state of nature, and non zero-sum in the 
civil state. One’s gain of power means another’s loss in the statof nature; 
however, one’s gain is not necessarily another’s loss in the civil state. Hobbes’s 
view of power shows how the nature of power matters in achieving cooperation. 
Hobbes’s most general definition of power is “one’s present means to obtain 
future apparent good.”24 An interesting feature of this definition is that power is 
described as a relation between present means and future apparent good. “The 
power of a man, to take it universally, is his present means to obtain some future 
apparent good, and is either original or instrumental. Reputation of power is 
power; because it draweth with it the adherence of those that need prot ction. So 
is reputation of love of a man’s country, called popularity, for the same reason. 
Also, what quality soever maketh a man beloved or feared of many, or the 
reputation of such quality, is power; because it is a means to have t e assistance 
and service of many. Good success is power; because it maketh reputation of 
wisdom or good fortune, which makes men either fear him or rely on him.” 
(Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 72.) 
                                                                                                                                    
ecclesiasticall and civil, Edited by Michael Oakeshott with Introduction by Richard S. Peters, 
New York, N.Y.: Touchstone 
24 Hobbes, 1962. P. 72 
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After providing a general definition of human power, Hobbes makes a simple 
distinction between the natural resources of power and the instrumental eans of 
power that man may command. “Natural power is the eminence of the faculties of 
body, or mind; as extraordinary strength, form, prudence, arts, eloquence, 
liberality, nobility. Instrumental are those powers which, acquired by these, or by 
fortune, are means and instruments to acquire more; as riches, reputation, friends, 
and the secret working of God, which men call good luck. For the nature of power 
is, in this point, like to fame, increasing as it proceeds; or like the motion of heavy 
bodies, which, the further they go, make still the more haste.” (Hobbes, Leviathan 
p.72) 
In his power resources, the non-material resources, such as prudence, art, 
reputation, liberty, and eloquence, are included with the material resourc , such 
as body, wealth and strength. The ‘present means’ of man—his faculties of body 
or mind, his riches or reputation—do not by themselves constitute power as 
Hobbes describes it. 
Consider honor as a source of power. Certain achievements or abilities are 
transformed into power through acts of evaluation by others. This means that the 
value of a man’s prudence, eloquence, riches or any other natural or instrumental 
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resource depends on the judgment of others. Once a man possesses power 
resources, he can use them to force his own will on others. Hobbes gives a 
suggestion to use both coercive and persuasive resources. 
Power is the ability to achieve desired outcomes, and the nature of power is 
relational. Some of its sources have a material base, while others have non-
material base. General interpretations on Hobbes’s power concept focused on 
power as being substantive—as possession of material resources. Contrary to 
these interpretations, Hobbes clearly gives his view on power as a n tural and 
instrumental one. To Hobbes, power has non-material as well as material nature. 
To possess a bag of gold can be a power resource; however, having a good 
reputation also can be an important power resource. 
There are three basic ways to make power work in Leviathan: persuasion, 
coercion, and obligation. Persuasion depends on the present existence of shared 
interests between the one who persuades and the one who is persuaded. 
Persuasion is where one or both sides seek to exercise power over the other 
through bargaining. Coercion implies the absence of shared interests. Thus, in the 
state of nature, coercion is the most appropriate method to the pure zero-sum 
concept of power where shared interests do not exists and for that reason one’s 
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gain is another’s loss. Obligation is based on prior agreement for perceived 
common interest, and in order to bind prior obligation, some kind of present 
compelling way is in need. 
The study of power traditionally had emphasized the more coercive and 
dominating aspects of power than persuasive and attractive aspects. This chapter 
takes a different position from traditional perspectives, focusing on the sources of 
soft power while it does not deny the role of hard power sources. According to 
Hobbes, shared belief is not enough to bind states together in peace, since bonds 
of belief are too weak to bind individuals’ endless ambition for power. This does 
not mean, however, that coercive power is more fundamental to a stableworld 
than relations created by common beliefs. 
Hobbes believes that violence alone is not sufficient to establish a ruling power. 
Coercive power comes into being only when the subjects conceive him to be their 
authorized ruler. From Hobbes’s perspective, the greatest of the human power is 
that which is compounded of the powers of most men, united by consent. This 
power is not forced by coercion, but consented by mutual interests. Power is 
relational. Political power lies in human relations to persuade or coerce others. 
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In Hobbes’s general definition of power, nothing requires that one’s power comes 
at the expense of another’s power. To make the transition from the sta e of nature 
to a civil state possible, Hobbes’s definition of power is changed from zero-sum, 
“a state of war of each against all” to non zero-sum, “a state of common 
interests.” Persuasion is a power source based on shared interests; coercion is a 
power source based on zero-sum interests; obligation is a power source based on 
prior common interest and present compelling mechanism. Power relations based 
on an internalized sense of obligation may operate with very little use of threat of 
coercion. This is why soft power that is based on persuasion or reputation is 
important. According to Hobbes’s general definition of power, ‘reputation’ s 
clearly an important source of power. 
Three Approaches 
There have been three major approaches of the theoretical conceptualization of 
power in international relations: realism; liberalism; constructivism. This is 
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legitimacy can be a 
source of military 
power 
Fails to understand that 
democratic regimes survive 
only if they safeguard military 
power and security; some 
liberals forget that transitions 
to democracy are sometimes 
violent 
Does not explain 
which power 
structures and social 
conditions allow for 




Michael Doyle,  
Robert Keohane 
Alexander Wendt,  
John Ruggie 
Source: Combination of Walt (1998. p.38) and Snyder (2004. p. 59)’s table 
The first approach, which focuses on the nature of state like a human, provides the 
most simple and powerful theoretical explanation of power in international 
politics. In the realist paradigm of power theory, states ar main units of analysis, 
and self-interested states compete for power and security. As a classical realist, 
Hans Morgenthau argues that international politics is a struggle for power, and he 
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defines power as “man’s control over the minds and actions of other man.” 
Morgenthau’s definition of power remains a basic reference in political science. 
From the neo-realism perspective, Kenneth Waltz argues that it is he system of 
international politics that forces states to seek power. One of the major 
characteristics of the structure of the international system is the distribution of 
capabilities. Waltz inherits some of Morgenthau’s basic notion of power analysis, 
while describing that not only military power but also economic growth and 
technological development become matters of intense concern in international 
politics.25 Gilpin also stresses that there are other important power factors such as 
public morale or the quality of political leadership, besides a state’  military or 
economic factors, describing the concept of power as one of the more
troublesome concepts in international relations.26 Generally, neorealist theorists 
emphasize the distribution of capabilities at the international system level. 
The second approach, liberalism, argues that political power is not limited to the 
nature or material resources of the state itself but includes resou ces that emerge 
                                                
25 Kenneth Waltz. 1979. Theories of International Politics. New York: McGraw Hill. P. 172. 
26  Robert Gilpin. 1981. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge, United Kingdom: 




from relations between actors. Though states are still the main actors, liberalism 
extends the unit of analysis from state to non state actors, such a  international 
organizations, non-governmental organizations or multinational corporations. 
According to this approach, states are still the main actors, but states’ power is 
relative, not absolute. This perspective is connected with the concept of 
interdependence, and has been developed in the neoliberal framework of 
international relations theory by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. 
Neoliberalism further distinguishes itself from realism by assuming that the 
spread of democracy, global economic ties, and international organizatio s will 
strengthen international peace. In addition, main actors and instruments for power 
vary, such as international institutions, economic exchange, promotion of 
democracy beyond state boundaries. 
The third approach is constructivism, which has an ability to account the changes 
of international politics after the end of the Cold War. Constructivism emphasizes 
the importance of ideas and values, and proposes that international politics is 
shared by persuasive ideas, collective values, culture, and social identities. 
Generally, constructivists’ theories are good for analyzing of new ideas, 
transnational activist networks, and nongovernmental organizations. 
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Constructivism is understood not as a homogenous theory, but as having 
numerous approaches. Alexander Wendt is regarded as the best example of a 
constructivist approach to international relations. Wendt’s theory, summarized as 
“anarchy is what states make of it,” seeks to outline both neo-realists and neo-
liberalists theories first, then criticizes that they lack the knowledge of identity 
and the role of norms and values as forces in accounting states’ behavior within 
the logic of power.27 
To constructivists, power is socially constructed and changes overtime. 
Constructivist interpretation of power is the view that power is heavily influenced 
by other social norms and practices. What makes the power concept of 
constructivism distinct from realism and liberalism is that it focuses on “mutually 
constitutive” characteristics. Wendt’s theory involves “inter-subjectivity” in the 
international system and the identities of states are “mutually constitutive,” which 
means that states’ behavior shapes their identity and the behaviors of other states. 
                                                
27 Alexander Wendt, 1992. “Anarchy is what States Make of it” International Organization. Vol.42, 




Nye’s Power: Hard Power + Soft Power = Smart Power? 
Power has many faces. Among them, Nye analyzes power’s immaterial resources 
with great detail. Whereas Nye does not repudiate the traditional definition of 
power, he critically examines classical approaches to define power, and shows 
that much of the previous analyses depend on material resources, such as military 
or economic aspects of power. While he still accepts state centred characteristics 
of power analysis, Nye describes how traditional hard power approach fails to 
explain the changes that globalization and information technologies brought. 
Soft power is defined as the ability to get what you want through attraction rather 
than coercion.28 This chapter uses the term “soft power” based on Joseph Nye’s 
definition, and explores Nye’s soft power concept. He was the first to introduce 
soft power to international relations, and he broadened the perspectives of 
international politics which was previously dominated by hard power. 
According to Nye, soft power rests in the ability of a state to shape the 
preferences of others: “getting others to want the same outcomes as you want.”29 
                                                
28 Nye 2004. p. x. 
29 Nye, 2004. “Soft power is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than 
coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and 
policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is 
enhanced.” (p. x). 
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Nye developed the concept of “soft power” in Bound to Lead, published in 1990, 
and refined the concept in Soft Power, published in 2004. In his recent book, Nye 
analyzes how the failure of the Bush administration to give sufficient weight to 
the potential for soft power affected U.S. efforts to build a strong coalition in 
support of its goals in global politics. 
Nye’s argument is balanced, clear, and convincing. He analyzes the changing 
context of power in international politics and explains why soft power is much 
more important than it was in the past.30 While Nye focuses primarily on the 
sources of American soft power, he also addresses how other states and non-state 
actors have made use of soft power. Nye examines how soft power can be 
wielded through public diplomacy, although he acknowledges that there are 
limitations to its creation and use. 
Nye suggests that there are three types of power that matter in global politics: 
military, economic, and soft.31 According to his argument, military power as hard 
power uses threat or force, and its main method is coercion or deterenc . As 
another type of hard power, economic power uses payments or sanctions, and it  
                                                
30 Shin, Yookyoung 2007. In the book review, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to 
Success in World Politics. Millennium – Journal of International Studies. Vol.35. No.2. 
31 Nye 2004. pp. 30-32. 
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main behavior is inducement or coercion. Soft power uses value, culture, policies, 
or institutions, and its main behavior is attraction or agenda setting. Nye argues 
that as a result of the information revolution in recent decades the locus of power 
has been shifting from military to economic and finally to soft power. 
Increasingly, it is informational resources that matter. 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, power sources of a state can be analyzed from 
many different perspectives. Nye divides the sources of national power into two 
categories—hard power and soft power. According to Nye, the distinct on 
between hard and soft power lies in different forms of behavior from coercion to 
attraction. Figure 2.1 shows that hard power is the ability to ge the outcomes 
through coercive factors. “Command power”—the ability to change what ot ers 
do—can rest on coercion or inducement, and “co-optive power”—the ability to 
shape what others want—can rest on the attractiveness of one’s culture and 
ideology or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices.32 Soft power 
is less costly to employ than military means, though it is more difficult to use, and 
takes more time to accumulate. 
                                                
32 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 1990. Bound to lead: the changing nature of American Power, New York: 
Basic Books, p. 267. 
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Figure 2.1 Command Power and Co-optive Power 
Source: Nye 1990. p. 267. 
One of Nye’s aims is to examine and assess the ability of the United States to 
create and use soft power effectively. At the heart of Nye’s argument is a critique 
of the Bush administration’s policies following September 11, 2001. Nye 
criticizes the Bush administration for focusing too much on hard power and trying 
to force other nations to follow America’s will. The failure of the Bush 
administration to gain broad support for the war against Iraq, argues Nye, stems 
from their decision to turn to coercion without first exploring the potential 
afforded by soft power. 
Nye argues that the United States’ invasion of Iraq in the name of d mocracy and 
the Bush administration’s unilateral policies have made it more difficult to 
develop cooperative approaches toward solving global problems. The Bush 
administration’s emphasis on hard over soft power have made it difficult to 
achieve global consensus on America’s foreign policy. 
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This chapter agrees with the idea that the use of coercive capabilities alone does 
not guarantee national security. Security comes from a careful wielding of both 
hard and soft power. In the global information age, the United States’ ability to 
achieve the outcome it wants will depend on how attractive its image is. 
Much of the existing literature on soft power maintains that a nation can increase 
its influence over others by disseminating its culture. But this kind of view puts 
too much focus on cultural aspects without considering existing social, political, 
and economic conditions. 
Although Nye argues persuasively, his argument has some challenges a d 
limitations as he acknowledges. First, his concept of soft power is not concrete, 
easily measurable, or predictable. The concept of soft power cannot be as neatly 
quantified as hard power. The attractiveness of culture, political ide s, and values 
is difficult to define or measure. 
Second, the boundary of each power resource is rather blurry because they are 
interactive. Hard power and soft power sometimes reinforce, and sometimes 
interfere with each other. For example, the Bush administration’s inva ion of Iraq 
made it difficult to achieve the soft power of the U.S. in global politics. 
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In addition, hard power sometimes can be used as a source of soft power, and vice 
versa. For example, the soft power of the Internet might not have been developed 
without the hard power stemming from the U.S. economic abilities. If we do not 
have the economic ability to afford computer hardware, then the access of 
information itself cannot be available. 
Nye does see these limitations to the concept of soft power and ecognizes that 
there is a need for “smart power”—a combination of soft power and hard power. 
He suggests that we should use both soft and hard power to obtain a well-
balanced power. America’s success will depend on developing a deeper 
understanding of the role of soft power in foreign policy, and achieving this will 
result in the ability of the United States to wield smart power. The question that 
remains is what can be done to improve America’s potential to use smart power 
effectively. 
There are two major differences between Nye’s argument and the argument in this 
dissertation. First, Nye set economic power as major source of hard power 
whereas economic power turns into soft power as well as hard power in the 
framework of this dissertation. Second, among soft power resources, this 
dissertation argues that information via the Internet media is an essential resource 
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Chapter 3. The Internet as a New Media 
Technological progress has played an important role in international relations. 
This fact can be applied not only to recent politics, but also to 18th and 19th 
century politics. As Anderson argues, actors were inspired by the great scientific 
breakthroughs of their day - the telegraph, the railroad, or industrial production.33 
To understand and analyze the Internet’s impact on global politics, understanding 
the role of the Internet as a new media is essential, particul ly at the global level. 
The Internet is a unique media, and it can be described as a combination of 
technology, communication, and media. It is also a political, economic, social, 
and cultural invention. In terms of its global impact, the Internet has changed 
global politics by providing opportunities to access previously unavailable 
information. 
If we accept that information is a source of power, then understanding how it is 
used, distributed, and interpreted is an essential aspect of understanding politics. 
                                                
33 Bonnie S. Anderson 2000. “Panorama,” chapter 1 of Anderson, Joyous Greetings: The First 
International Women’s Movement, 1830-1860. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 7-27. 
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Some technologies enhance what people are already doing, and simply make 
those activities faster, easier, or less expensive, while other technologies offer 
entirely new possibilities. This chapter will discuss the Internet’s ability that 
enables entirely new possibilities in the political arena as well as making people’s 
activities faster, easier or less expensive beyond borders. 
The media have had the crucial role of disseminating information to people, and 
the Internet has affected overall political communication. In early stages, the 
Internet created optimistic views on the digital democracy for a better world, 
creating more opportunities for active participation in the political arena. At the 
same time, there has been also consciousness of the potential dangers of the 
Internet as a new technology. The Internet as a new media also has had negative 
influences, which is relatively much less than the positive impacts on it. Cyber 
terror and digital divide are major negative examples of the Internet. 
Within this dissertation, the Internet refers to the digital communications media 
that are available through the World Wide Web. More specifically, this includes 
emails, websites, search engines, bulletin boards, blogs, and digital media players 
for audio and video contents. 
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The Nature of the Internet 
Different communication media have different mechanisms. We can see world 
events only through media report, whether the media is print, radio, television or 
the Internet. The information that certain media deliver is different according to 
the type of media. Even regarding the same events, different media r port in 
different ways from different perspectives. Traditional media, such as newspaper, 
radio, or television are still very powerful and reliable in terms of the impact and 
accessibility for people. But it is also true that new media, such as the Internet, 
provide more detailed information in a pararrel setting rather than in  top-down 
one. 
The Internet is a network communication media without any central control 
authority. The Internet’s characteristic of disorganization has served as a means to 
facilitate anti-hierarchical communication, meaning less centralized control, less 
government intervention, and less censorship compared to existing print, radio or 
television media. Unlike the traditional mass media, the control over contents on 
the Internet usually belongs to those individuals, institutions, or organizations that 
produce the messages, free from central regulation authorities.   
 42 
 
Everyday life continuously asks us to make decisions and choices. To do that, we 
need information. The kind of information we need may vary from the individual 
level to the international. Also, there can be various sources of information, such 
as family, friend, newspaper, television, or Google.  
The Internet provides more diverse and in-depth information through hyperlinks 
and search engines. It does not simply provide a larger volume of information, 
and it also enables easy access to more complex information. Unlimited access 
with no boundaries in time and space also allows the audience to choose t e 
information they want, while the other traditional media frame and set the agenda. 
A further advantage to the audience is the multiple functions of the Internet: text, 
music, graphic, animation and video. 
The Internet is continually evolving, especially in application to global politics. 
From a political perspective, the Internet has expanded the issue areas from 
offline to online, and actors from national to transnational. It has enhanced the 
quality of information as well as its quantity. It has also reshaped who produces 
information, who delivers it, and how it is received. 
There are two streams of scholars who have generally different vi ws on the 
nature of the Internet. One group is based partly on the idea of technology 
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determinism, and sees the Internet as replacement tool. The other group is based 
on the idea of social constructivism, and sees it as a supplemental tool. 
Technology determinism assumes that technological developments lead to social 
change. To them, technology is a major vehicle for changes and development in 
society.34 
However, this view is critically examined by other scholars who argue that 
technology determinism is an extreme theory, because the theory ignores other 
factors, arguing that technology solely determines the development and ch nges 
of society.35 Technology determinism tends to see the Internet as a revolutionary 
tool to bring fundamental changes to society. What this assumes in the reality of 
world politics is that technology will allow people access the Int rnet completely 
and equally, which is not the case. From critical viewpoints, technology is not a 
sufficient condition determining social development. 
Social constructivism, on the other hand, views reality as “constructed” by social 
relationships and interactions. Thus, social constructivism argues that tec nology 
is meaningful only when it has significant relationships with human beings, and 
                                                
34 Chandler, 1995. 
35 Bimber, 1994 
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only when it has interactions with other factors in society. Contrary o technology 
determinism, social constructivism weighs much more on human beings’ will and 
attitude in explaining the relationship between technology and social 
development. 
Thus, social constructivists argue that technology is controlled by human action 
and is given meaning through humans’ selection of how, when and why it will be 
used. Unlike technology determinism, the access and use of the Internet is 
influenced by the user’s educational or socioeconomic background. Social 
constructivists and those who share their idea of the Internet’s effect on politics 
see the Internet as a supplemental tool. Accordingly, off-line politics moves into 
online because it is fast, convenient, less expensive and effective.  
Social constructivists argue that information provided by the Interne  is mostly 
supplementary and complementary source rather than a unique information 
source.36 Therefore, to them, the Internet is not a significant medium to bring 
socioeconomic or political change unless the users adopt the new technology to 
                                                




change their existing attitudes. For example, to access the In ernet does not 
guarantee anything about political behavior unless users actually use the Internet 
for political purpose. 
The revolutionary nature of the Internet is emphasized in this dissertation, rather 
than a supplemental tool. This dissertation partly agrees with the importance of 
technology in bringing social changes; however, at the same time, i  also agrees 
with the social constructivists’ idea that there are other existing important factors 
to determine the path of human development beyond technological developments. 
Even the access and the use of technologies are determined by existing 
educational, socioeconomic and political backgrounds. The Internet can be 
controlled, though not completely, by human beings’ purpose and need. 
The Internet as Political Communication 
The Internet is a valuable means of political communication, but its value depends 
not on the communication technology itself but how it is politically exercised. 
Internet revolution and evolution as a political media rest on different political 
environments. The Internet is an interactive and democratic communicatio  media 
beyond national boundaries. As a new communication technology, the Internet 
has opened doors to new forms of political participation. But it is important to 
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note that the Internet alone cannot promote democracy. Active civil and st te 
efforts are essential to promote the political use of the Internet. 
The literature on media and politics is quite rich and diverse, and demonstrates 
that the role of media is essential in achieving successful political outcomes. A 
full analysis of political communications is well beyond the scope f this chapter, 
but a brief overview is useful to understand the context of the relation between 
media and politics. The interactive use of the Internet has influenced both the 
process and outcome of political activities. 
The instantaneity of the Internet has raised critical questions and theoretical 
reflections on the social phenomenon of speed.37 Studies on the expanded use of 
the Internet as a campaign tool have developed to show the impact and pote tial 
of the Internet. Gibson identified three potential impacts: the large volume and 
high speed at which information is transmitted could provide a more substantive 
basis for campaigning than other forms of media; the ability to identify users 
makes it possible to target groups of voters; the interactive nature of the 
                                                
37 Scheuerman, 2004 
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technology allows interested parties to accrue nearly instantaneous feedback on 
their campaign and positions.38 
Change in communication technology and flow of new information can bring 
significant political transformation if the people use the technology and new 
information for reconstructing their own identities and if they form different 
views of the world, state, or society in which they live. Historically, new 
communication technology has enabled the creation of channels of information 
and more information that provides participants an alternative view. 
The Internet, as a new communication media, has enabled people around the 
world to be linked together in virtual communities as never before. Th  Internet 
redefines time and space. The Internet is regarded as bringing two fundamental 
transformations in world politics. First, the new technology changed th  way 
people think about their identities and how they are connected to others. More 
importantly, the forces of political change are not limited in the communication 
technology itself, but interact with the socioeconomic or cultural realities. S cond, 
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information is an essential source of power among many other source , such as 
military force or economic might. 
Opportunities provided by the Internet are enormous. The Internet, which 
originally began as a small computer network for the U.S. Department of 
Defense, has now expanded to a global infrastructure. The Internet has developed 
from simple network service to industrial, commercial, governmental, and 
academic purposes. Via the Internet, an ever-increasing share of search, 
communication, commercial transactions, and entertainment takes place around 
the world. It is very plausible that the Internet is considered to be a vehicle for 
political and socioeconomic development in many ways. 
New vs. Old Communication Media 
In contrast to traditional media’s homogenous nature of contents, the Internet has 
an explicitly heterogeneous nature of the content, and the way people use it, 
generally depending on their socioeconomic or cultural backgrounds. According 
to knowledge gap hypothesis, people with low socioeconomic status use new 
media primarily for entertainment purposes, whereas those with high status would 
use new media mainly for an informational purpose. 
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The knowledge gap hypothesis, which will be addressed in Chapter 5, posits that 
as the infusion of mass media information into a social system increases, people 
with higher socioeconomic status tend to acquire this information  a faster rate 
than the people with lower status.39 In other words, the informational use of mass 
media would have different levels of information acquired for individuals with 
different socioeconomic background. 
The new media like the Internet, and old media, such as newspaper, r dio, or 
television, are different in terms of the possible gaps both in access and usage. 
The gap generally refers to the disparities in the access and use of media among 
individuals with different socioeconomic backgrounds. In particular, the Internet 
provides far more choices as far as content than do traditional forms of media, but 
the gap in access and usage tends to be greater. Television is much easier to 
access for most, and requires almost no knowledge in how to use it, while the 
Internet requires both the more expensive machine and the skill of using it. For 
example, whereas even a one-year-old can enjoy a television show, there are 
many adults who do not know how to send an email, or how to upload and 
download. 
                                                
39 Tichenor et al., 1970 
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Television is an immediate and immersive media, capable of transmitting images 
and sound, and is accessible to nearly everyone both in terms of affordability of 
the equipment as well as the fairly low level of content sophistication it offers. 
Television has been noted to be the most revolutionizing media in the las several 
decades for political life as well as commercial, or entertainment purposes. 
Although internet use is quickly increasing, the three media formats th  are most 
frequently used in politics remain print, radio, and television. There are some 
major distinctions between the Internet and other forms of old communication 
media. 
First, the cost of the Internet is rapidly decreasing for both users and producers. In 
addition, the boundaries between information consumer and information producer 
are becoming blurred. The low barrier to entry provided by the Intrne  has 
opened up new opportunities to diverse groups and individuals. 
The cost of using new media, such as the Internet, is relatively low.  Sending an 
email to a large audience costs nothing more than the cost of the Internet 
connection. Political campaigns through websites cost much less than traditional 
media, such as television or radio commercials. More importantly, a website can 
be updated very quickly at real time, which is a sharp contrast from traditional 
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media type. People can be easily connected with others regardless of distance and 
time. 
Second, there are no significant barriers based on content or viewpoints. This is 
an important characteristic, since traditional media frequently fail to include 
minor views. Contrary to old media, in cyberspace there are no “gate keeper,” so 
the Internet provides much freedom of various viewpoints. This is in sharp 
contrast to traditional media, where producers play the role of gatekeeper in 
determining which issues and topics are considered newsworthy to report. Using 
the Internet for political communication allows people to bypass some f the 
agenda setting and gate keeping effects of mass news media.40 
Third, the Internet is a dynamic and interactive form of communication, with 
constantly updated and evolving content. Furthermore, a website is available at all 
times from anyplace with an internet connection. In contrast to old media, internet 
users can access website content anytime, anywhere, and as many as they want to 
they get the access to the website content. The flexibility of the Internet 
communication media increases the power of the user to decide how much or how 
little content to access, which content is useful and which is ignored. 
                                                
40 Johnson, 2003. 
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This attribute allows a dialogue among members of an online community, 
enabling instant feedback and networking among all participants regardl ss of 
their status in the socioeconomic hierarchy. Websites can make various virtual 
activities happen, ranging from email to blogs to chat rooms. 
As stated, the Internet is more interactive, flexible, and informative than any other 
traditional media. These characteristics of the Internet provide an opportunity to 
the have-nots in society to participate in it. The Internet is inexpensive and 
accessible, potentially allowing minorities to participate and compete in 
cyberspace. 
The Internet is more than just a new type of communication media. In a
fundamental way, it transforms political and socioeconomic reality we face. In 
addition, the Internet redefines the concept of time and space, providing ma y 
new opportunities. More importantly the interactivity of the Internet has the 
ability to make a clear separation from traditional media formats. The Internet 
changed our notion about who produces what, blurring the boundaries between 
consumers and creators. 
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Chapter 4. The Political Use of the Internet and Soft 
Power 
Chapter 4 attempts to make theoretical and empirical connections between he 
concept of power and the rise of soft power in the reality of global politics. 
Chapter 4 takes a close look at the Internet as a new form of communication 
media with particular emphasis on the political use of the Internet. This chapter 
will show the ability of the Internet as a political media on national, regional, and 
global levels. 
The overall argument of this dissertation is that the information pr vided by the 
Internet brought three expansions in global politics: expansion of the concept of 
political power from hard to soft; expansion of main actors from natio l to 
transnational; expansion of issue areas from offline to online. In order to show 
both theoretical and empirical connections between the changing concept of 
power and the rise of soft power in the reality of global politics, the Internet 
impact from three different levels will be examined—first, cyber politics in the 
2002 South Korean presidential election; second, soft power in East Asia; and 
third, transnational online activism.  
 54 
 
National Level - Cyber Politics in 2002 South Korean Presidential Election 
The 2002 Korean presidential election shows the political impact of the Internet at 
the national level. It was widely reported that Roh, Moo-hyun won the 16th South 
Korean presidential election primarily because he had dominated his counterpart 
Lee, Hoi-chang in online campaigning. 
“A fierce cyber campaign to mobilize younger voters proved crucial in bringing 
about the ruling Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) candidate Roh, Moo-
hyun’s victory over Grand National Party (GNP) candidate Lee Hoi-Chang in a 
closely-contested presidential election in December 2002.”41 “One of the factors 
which made Roh’s victory possible was the advanced penetration of informati n 
infrastructure in Korea, particularly broadband internet access. Roh was very 
successful in mobilizing his supporters, especially young voters, in cyberspace.”42 
These reports, however, are problematic in the sense that the turnout of voters in 
their twenties amounted to only 47.5%, and this represents a 20.7% decrease in 
voter participation for this age group in comparison to the previous presidential 
                                                
41 Chan-kyung Park 2004. “South Korean vote goes down to the wire for cyber generation.” 
Agence France Presse, April 14 




election in 1997.43 Then, what are the real effects of the Internet in the 2002 
Korean presidential election? 
Questions to be investigated in this chapter are as follows: what as the impact 
and the role of the Internet on the 2002 Korean presidential election; what kind of 
influence did the Internet have on the changing concept of power?; and how id it 
make a difference? From these questions, this chapter argues that when the 
Internet is effectively used as a campaign tool in a presidential election, the 
candidate is more likely to win the race. That is, the successful use of the Internet 
has a positive effect on election results. 
The rate of internet usage has a positive relationship with the support rate for Roh 
in the 2002 Korean presidential election. This shows that the younger gen ation 
who uses the Internet was more likely to vote for Roh. Roh’s effective use of the 
Internet in the 2002 presidential election played an important role in his victory. 
The questions explored in this chapter are best addressed using a combination of 
case study, data coding, and statistical comparison. In interpreting statistic data, 
we need to be cautious of what the numbers really represent. Data from the 
                                                
43 National Election Commission (NEC) http://www.nec.go.kr 
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National Election Commission (NEC) and Millennium Democratic Party’s White 
Paper on the 16th presidential election will be essential sources. Journal artic es, 
books, and news media reportings will also provide valuable facts and data. 
Related websites such as “Nosamo” also serve as important source  for analysis. 
By critically analyzing the 2002 Korean presidential election data provided by the 
NEC, Millennium Democratic Party’s white paper on the 16th presidential election 
in 2002, and news media coverage of the election, this chapter tries to get 
empirical focus on the emerging impact of the Internet on the 2002 Korean 
presidential election, and to explain how the Internet had an impact on the 
election. 
The exploration of cyber politics in the 2002 South Korean presidential election 
aims to shed light on the impact of the Internet on the changing scopeof political 
power by examining how Mr. Roh won. Generally, there are three things to 
consider when we discuss the political use of the Internet. First, we need to be 
cautious not to correlate the increase of internet access with widespread use of the 
Internet for political purposes because the use of the Internet does not guarantee a 
political use of the Internet. Second, the relationship between individuals’ online 
political activities and their actual voting behavior needs to be addressed. Third, it 
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is clear that traditional mass media such as television or newspapers are still much 
more effective than the Internet in an election. 
For these risks, systematic study of the Internet uses by, and effects on, political 
actors such as presidential election candidates and their votershas been limited. 
Most academic analysis of online electioneering has focused on the distribution 
and content of websites, rather than evaluating the effectiveness of internet-based 
campaigning for building a support base and generating votes and resources.44 
Background 
Actual implementations of the Internet in political contexts differ from country to 
country. As the population of internet users has quickly grown, the Internet 
campaign has become a growing phenomenon, and most research on the political 
use of the Internet is done on western liberal democracies, such as the U.S. and 
the U.K. Limitless possibilities of the Internet for making new forms of political 
engagement by citizens have been presented from various perspectives. 
                                                
44 See Rachel K. Gibson, Michael Margolis, David Resnick, and Stephen Ward. 2003. “Election 
Campaigning on the WWW in the US and UK: A Comparative Analysis.” Party Politics, Vol. 9, 
No. 1, pp. 47-75 
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The emergence of new information and communication technologies (ICTs) in the 
1990s led to the utilization of internet as a campaign tool. The growing use of the 
Internet as a campaign tool in elections has the potential for future s dy of the 
Internet use and its power in political contexts. However, it is very difficult to find 
a systemic study to assess political campaigns on the web in Asia. The potential 
influences of the Internet on elections differ from traditional mss media, because 
the characteristics are different from those of traditional media. The surprise 
victory of Mr. Roh in the election can be seen as providing the indication of the 
Internet’s power to influence an election outcome. 
Literature on cyber democracy has focused on the possibilities for direct 
democracy and closer connections between individuals and governments through 
the Internet. Negroponte presented “limitless possibilities” of the Int rnet for 
forging new and stronger forms of political engagement by citizens.45 Gibson 
identified three potential impacts of the Internet: the large volume and high speed 
at which information is transmitted could provide a more substantive basis for 
campaigning than other forms of media; the ability to identify users makes it 
possible to target groups of voters, thereby allowing for the personalization of 
                                                
45 For more detailed view on this issue, see N. Negroponte 1995. Being Digital. London: Coronet. 
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email messages, pop-up ads, or links to specific group members; the interactive 
nature of the Internet that allows people to get almost instantaneous feedback on 
their campaign. In addition, the voter could gain an active role in the campaign by 
getting more direct access to candidates. 
Online Politics in South Korea 
As shown in Table 4.1 South Korea is the most internet-savvy country in the 
world. Its DSL users almost doubled the average OECD DSL users, and 
broadband subscribers per 100 inhabitants ranked number 1. According to a 
survey by Korea Network Information Center (KRNIC), about 26,270,000 people 
use the Internet at least once a month. This is about 59.4% of the population age 6 
years and over, and among these, 71.8% access the Internet everyday and their 
average usage time per week is 13.5 hours. 
Table 4.1 Broadband subscribers per 100 inhabitants, by technology, June 2005 
 DSL Cable Other Total* Rank Total Subscribers 
S. Korea 13.9 8.9 2.7 25.5 1 12,260,969 
U.S. 5.5 8.0 1.1 14.5 12 42,645,815 
OECD 7.2 3.8 0.8 11.8  136,651,000 
 
Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Broadband 




The Internet was a major campaign tool in the 2002 presidential election in South 
Korea. The number of election law violations committed in cyberspace shows the 
intensity of online campaigning in the last election: online election law violations 
(54.5%) was greater than offline election law violations for the first t me. There 
were 735 online violations in 2002, more than double the 346 crimes reported in 
the 1997 presidential election. Violations that occurred in cyberspace were much 
greater than those related to money and goods which had been the most co mon 
in previous elections.46 
Roh’s fundraising efforts also showed the emerging impact of the Internet use in 
presidential election. Largely through the Internet based groups, Roh raised over 7 
billion won from more than 200,000 individuals. (See table 4.2) Nosamo, which 
means “people who love Roh, Moo-hyun,” started out as an online group in May 
2000, right after the president-elect was defeated in his bid for an Assembly seat 
in the Pusan district, and its membership reached 70,000 before the presidential 
election and 80,000 after the election. As of December 2005, three years after 
winning the election, membership was up to 109,611. 
                                                
46 Dong-a Ilbo 2002. December 22 
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During his campaign, voters could get Mr. Roh’s message from internet sites that 
featured video clips of the candidate. Nosamos’s energetic activism s often 
regarded as a factor for Mr. Roh’s triumph in the 2002 presidential election. It had 
a great contribution in creating the culture of voluntary politica donation. The 
website boasts a democratic decision-making process through onlinediscussions, 
and it has expanded beyond cyberspace. Overall, the Internet helped Mr. Roh to 
distance himself from corporate donations that are South Korea’s traditional 
forms of campaign financing in the past. 
 
Table 4.2 Roh Camp’s Fundraising through Electronic Media 
 Number of Donation Amount of Donation (won) 
Credit Card 31,899 1,329,876,426 
Mobile Phone 20,165 347,045,283 
ARS 21,188 211,880,000 
On-line transfer 101,635 4,320,699,711 
“Piggy Bank” 22,042 759,633,678 
“Hope Ticket” 6,835 309,000,000 
Total 203,764 7,278,135,098 
 
Source: Millennium Democratic Party, 16 dae daetongnyeong seon-geo baekseo (A 
White Paper on the 16th Presidential Election 2003) 
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The Difference that the Internet Made 
Table 4.3 represents generational voting patterns in the 2002 presidential election: 
the voters in their twenties Roh earned 62.1% support, while Lee collected 31.7%, 
resulting in a difference of 30.4%; from the voters in their thirties, Roh won 
59.3% support and defeated Lee by 25.4%; voters in their fifties or higher favored 
Lee over Roh by 18.5%. Roh’s victory over Lee among voters in their tw nties 
and thirties can be accounted for the effects of the Internet wh n the high rate of 
internet use at the time of election in voters in their twenties and thirties is 
considered (see table 4.3).  Most voters in their twenties and thirties were active 
internet users. Overall, through tables 4.3 and 4.4, we can see that Roh was able to 
collect support from young voters and won the presidential race in 2002. 
 
Table 4.3 Generational Vote in the 2002 Presidential Election (%) 
 20s 30s 40s 50s or higher 
Roh Moo-hyun 62.1 59.3 47.4 39.8 
Lee Hoi-chang 31.7 33.9 48.7 58.3 
Others 6.2 6.8 3.9 1.9 
Difference 30.4 25.4 -1.3 -18.5 
 
Source: Millennium Democratic Party, 16 dae daetongnyeong seon-geo baekseo (A 





Table 4.4 Growth of Internet Access Rate by Age (Unit: %) 
  20s 30s 40s Over 50s 
Dec 2000 74.6 43.6 22.7 5.7 
Dec 2001 84.9 61.6 35.6 8.7 
Dec 2002 89.8 69.4 39.3 9.3 
Source: KNIC (2003, 18) 
The rate of internet usage has a positive relationship with the support rate for Roh 
in the 2002 Korean Presidential Election. This is to show that the younger 
generation who uses the Internet had a tendency to vote for Roh. To examin  this, 
quntitative data analysis on the 2002 Korean presidential election is implemented 
as follows: the data on internet usage rate, which is the independent variable in 
this test, is collected from the National Internet Development Agency of Korea 
(NIDA), and the data on the support rate for Roh, which is the dependent variable 
in this test, is collected from Millennium Democratic Party’s white paper on the 
16th Presidential Election in 2002. Minitab was used for the statistical analysis and 
the regression was chosen to show the relationship between two variables. 





Figure 4.1 The Chart for Generational Vote in the 2002 Presidential Election (%) 
 
Table 4.5 Internet Using Rate by age (%) 
 20s 30s 40s Over 50s 
2001.6 80.3 54.1 32.2 13.2 
2002.6 86.0 66.7 38.9 17.5 
2003.6 94.3 78.5 50.8 23.2 
2004.6 95.0 86.4 58.3 27.6 
Source: The 2004 report of the National Internet Development Agency (NIDA) of Korea 
 






























The above Figure 4.2 shows the line chart of the Table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.6 The data used in the test. 
 20s 30s 40s Over 50s 
Roh Moo-Hyun 62.1 59.3 47.4 39.8 
2002.6 86.0 66.7 38.9 17.5 
 
Figure 4.3 The chart for the variables 
The above Figure 4.3 shows the chart of the Table 4.6. 
Following regression analysis of the support rate for Roh versus the Internet using 
rate shows that the Internet using rate is correlated with the support rate for Roh 
in the 2002 Korean presidential election, and proves that the younger generation 
who uses the Internet had a tendency to vote for Roh. 
 
Regression Analysis: Support Rate for Roh versus the Internet Using Rate  

















Support Rate for Roh = 34.3 + 0.341* Internet Using Rate 
 
Predictor                Coef    SE Coef       T      P 
Constant               34.333     2.187    15.70   0.004  
Internet Using Rate   0.34083   0.03743    9.11   0.012 
 
S = 1.95683   R-Sq = 97.6%   R-Sq(adj) = 96.5% 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source          DF       SS       MS      F      P 
Regression       1   317.55  317.55  82.93  0.012 
Residual Error   2     7.66     3.83 
Total            3  325.21 
 
Obs   Internet Using Rate  Support Rate for Roh    Fit   SE Fit  Residual  St 
Resid 
  1        86.0    62.100     63.644   1.597    -1.544     -1.37 
  2       66.7     59.300     57.066   1.117     2.234      1.39 
  3       38.9     47.400     47.591   1.099    -0.191     -0.12 
  4       17.5     39.800     40.298   1.628    -0.498     -0.46 
 
The p-value for the constant is 0.004 < 0.05.  
The p-value of the Internet using rate is 0.012 < 0.05. 
 
Summary 
Cyberspace interacts with the real world and it cannot exist apart from the real 
world. The widespread use of the Internet does not necessarily mean an increase 
in the political use of it, and traditional media still remained much more effective 
than the Internet in election. However, this chapter argued that there was some 
evidence to show that Roh’s successful online campaign strategy supported his 
victory in the 2002 presidential election. The surprise victory of Roh in t e 2002 
presidential election can be seen as the emerging power of the Internet use in 
Korean presidential election. 
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Cyber campaign in South Korea proved that the Internet is an effective tool for 
presidential election, and Roh’s effective use of it made a contribution to the 
victory in the election. The successful use of the Internet has a powerful and 
positive effect on election results. 2002 Korean presidential election revealed how 
the Internet impacts national politics, and how it changes the concept of political 
power from offline to online. 
Regional Level - Soft Power in East Asia 
This part explores Nye’s soft power at the regional level, focusing on Japan’s soft 
power in East Asia. The formation, development, and change of soft power 
inevitably have both national and international background. 
In analyzing the soft power of Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul, Japan offers th  most 
interesting example, since there is a big gap between Japan’s soft power at the 
global and regional levels. 
According to The Japan Times, Japan ranks first worldwide in the number of 
patents, third in expenditure on research and development as a share of GDP, 
second in book sales and music sales, first for life expectancy, ad it is home to 
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three of the top 25 multinational brand names such as Toyota, Honda, and Sony.47 
In addition, Japan’s global cultural influence grew in areas ranging from fashion 
and food to electronics and game systems, such as DS or Wii by Nintendo. 
It is interesting to note that there are serious limitations t Japan’s soft power, 
particularly at the regional level. The residual suspicion that lingers in countries 
like China and Korea sets limits on Japan’s appeal, and it is renforced every time 
the Japanese prime minister visits the Yasukuni Shrine. This shows just one 
example among many that Japan’s regional soft power differs from its global soft 
power. 
Globally Japan’s culture seems to produce potential soft power resourc  much 
better than in the rest of East Asia. Why is that the case? Why does there exist 
such a big gap in Japan’s soft power between the global and regional levels? How 
and why does Japan’s soft power matter in East Asia? How does Japan’s soft 
power work or not work? What are the factors that limit Japan’s soft power in 
East Asia? 
                                                
47 The Japan Times, December 5, 2005 
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Here, I focus on the limitations of Japan’s soft power in dealing with the 
relationships among Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo. From the questions noted above, 
this chapter presents the following arguments. First, the limitat ons on Japan’s 
soft power are caused by a distortion of its history, which has negative effects on 
its regional power in East Asia. Namely, Japan’s insincere attitude about its past 
war crimes decreases its soft power in East Asia. Second, when Japan has 
limitations on its regional soft power, it is less likely to achieve its national 
interests. 
This chapter assumes that soft power contributes to Japan’s ability to achieve its 
goals, and aims to show that soft power comes from universalism, not from 
parochial nationalism. This work seeks to contribute to studies of East Asia, 
China-Japan relation, and Korea-Japan relation, particularly focusing on the role 
of soft power in this region. This research aims to shed light on the role of soft 
power in East Asia to increase our theoretical knowledge of how it works. 
Background 
This section acknowledges that soft power doesn’t quantify neatly like hard 
power. Quantifying hard power, such as population, territory, raw material, or 
military forces is much easier than quantifying soft power, such as culture, 
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ideology, information, communication technology. The questions and arguments 
to be explored in this chapter will be best addressed using a combination of 
historical analysis, case study and the collection and coding of existing soft power 
literatures, as well as of news media reports on this issue. McDougall’s UN 
reports are important sources, and survey results of public opinion in China, Japan 
and South Korea are also major objects of analysis. 
Joseph Nye presented the changing sources of power, and argued that power is 
becoming less transferable, less tangible, and less coercive in an age of 
information-based economies and transnational interdependence.48  There are 
several different views on national power in international politics, and empirically 
there are three different ways of observing power: first, power as a resource; 
second, power as a relationship; third, power as a structure.49  As Hans J. 
Morgenthau offered, traditional realist theories of international rel tions rely on a 
power as a resource, such as population, military forces, economic size and 
natural resources.50 This shows that realists have a preference for hard power 
instead of soft power. 
                                                
48 Nye, p. 33 
49 Jeffrey Hart, “Three Approaches to the Measurement of Power in International Relations,” 
International Organization, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Spring 1976), pp. 289-305 
50 For traditional power concept, see Chapter 9 in Hans J. Morgenthau, 1985. Politics Among 
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How and Why Japan’s soft power matters in East Asia 
In assessing international power today, factors such as technology, education, and 
economic growth are becoming more important, whereas geography, population, 
and raw materials are becoming less important.51 As discussed, this dissertation 
does not deny that hard power such as military power remains important in 
international politics; however, it also recognizes that soft power is increasingly 
becoming as important as hard power. 
The term ‘soft’ means that one country’s national power does not comefro  
‘hard’ military resources but the good image stemming from culture, ideology, or 
popularity among the people in the region. Joseph Nye says that soft power is 
more than influence and persuasion, “it is also the ability to attract, and attraction 
often leads to acquiescence.”52 He argues that a good deal of Japan’s success has 
been due to the substitution of human skills for missing natural resources.53 
To Nye, the most striking feature of Japan’s power resources is its relative 
military weakness. The constitution in which “the Japanese people forever 
                                                                                                                                    
Nations:  The Struggle for Power and Peace, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf) 
51 Joseph S. Nye, 1990, p. 29 
52 Joseph S. Nye 1990, p. 6 
53 Joseph S. Nye 1990, p. 160 
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renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation,” was made by the United States 
during the post war occupation. Due to its peace constitution Japan has no 
military power In the security field. Therefore, this chapter agrees that there exists 
more leverage to explain Japan’s power in East Asia with the concept of soft 
power than hard power. Table 4.7 shows how the unresolved historical issues are 
important to China-Japan-Korea relations. 
 
Table 4.7 Opinion Poll - How important do you think the unresolved historical 
issues are to China-Japan-Korea relations? 
 Chinese Korean Japanese 
Very important 63% 46% 24% 
Somewhat important 29% 47% 51% 
Not very important 6% 6% 17% 
Not important at all 1% 1% 3% 
Don't know/No response 1% 0% 5% 
 
Source: Dong-A Ilbo, “Opinion Poll: Special Research on Chinese and Korean Attitudes 
toward Japan and Other Nations” Dates Conducted March 15-31, 2005 Released April 
26, 2005 This survey research was conducted as part of a joint research survey with 
Asahi Shimbun of Japan and The Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences (CASS). 
Concerning Japan’s soft power, Barry Buzan critically described how Japan’s 
reputation for aggressiveness and brutality in the half-century before 1945 
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continues to stunt its political life, both domestically and internatio lly.54 There 
is no doubt that Japan’s policy between 1895 and 1945 was aggressively 
expansionist and brutal to the oppressed people of countries they were occupying. 
Buzan also focused on two facts that highlight the extreme oddity of Japan’s 
contemporary international position. On the one hand, Japan is a major power 
with a wide range of global responsibilities and influence. But on the ot r hand, 
Japan still suffers heavy liabilities, such as systematical war crime organizing 
“comfort stations”, and whitewashing its war crimes in the new history textbooks, 
both in domestic political life and in its foreign relations. 
It is easily found in literature that Japan has not done a good job ofreconstructing 
its relationship with the East Asian States that were the main victims of its 
aggression. The sensitivity of China and Korea to the lies that Japan might be 
seeking to cover up from wartime is very acute. 
In order for a nation to be regarded as having soft power, it must have at least two 
things: presence and respect.55 First, the nation should not be ignored but should 
always be listened to, because of its presence. Second, respect must be earned so 
                                                
54 Barry Buzan 1988. “Japan’s Future: Old History versus New Roles” International Affairs Vol. 
64, No. 4, pp. 557-559. 
55 Gyohten, Toyoo 2004. “Japan’s Soft Power Reconsidered” Japanese Institute of Global 
Communications August 30th , http://www.glocom.org/ 
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that the nation’s opinion or position will be highly regarded by other nations. 
Without presence or respect, soft power cannot be a real power. In sum, Japan’s 
soft power in East Asia has been limited because Japan seems to lack the two 
sources of soft power: presence and respect. 
Three factors that limit Japan’s soft power in East Asia 
1. Japan’s administrating the system of military sex slaves during World War II 
It has been more than 50 years since the end of World War II. However, there are 
still agonized victims of Japan’s most brutal war crime, military sexual slavery, 
holding a peaceful protest in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, every 
Wednesday since 1992. This protest asks for Japan’s sincere apology, and for 
Japan’s crimes to be punished and redressed. 
In 1998, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights has been urged to hold 
Japanese responsible for sex slavery during World War II by the victims of 
Japan’s war crimes. The U.N. report on “systematic rape, sexual slavery and 
slavery-like practices during armed conflict” was submitted to a conference of the 
Sub-commission on Prevention of Discriminatory Action and Protection of 
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Minorities in Geneva.56 Gay McDougall, an investigator for the U.N., clearly 
defined “comfort women” as military sexual slavery and “comfort stations” as 
rape centers in her official report to the UN. 
According to McDougall, between 1932 and the end of World War II, the 
government of Japan and the Japanese Imperial Army forced over 200,000 
women into sexual slavery in rape centers throughout Asia. The majority of these 
“comfort women” were from Korea, but many were also taken from China, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Taiwan and other Asian countries under Japanese 
control. Over the past decade, an increasing number of survivors from Japan’s 
military sexual slavery has come forward to seek redress for these crimes. On 
August 1991, a South Korean woman named Kim Hak-Soon became the first 
former comfort woman to give a public testimony. Since then, about 200 women 
in Korea alone have come forward.57 
Women’s International Criminal Court for War Crime Tribunal found the
Japanese government guilty on Dec 4th 2001, pronouncing that Japan’s system of 
comfort women for the military during World War II fell into a case of “rape 
                                                
56 Jun, Kwan-woo 1998 Korea Herald August 13th 
57 Korea Chongshindae Institute, http://www.truetruth.org/know/know_03.htm 
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approved by the nation.”58  In addition, the court clarified where the responsibility 
lied, pronouncing, “The Japanese Government is also responsible for the matter of 
comfort women, which has gone unpunished for 56 years, and has not made a 
sufficient public-apology or enough reparations.” The court adjudged additionally 
that eight politicians and military commanders, including the Prime Minister of 
that time, were guilty. 
2. The Japanese government’s approval of a controversial history textbook 
Japan’s education ministry approved a new edition of a controversial jun or high 
school history textbook that critics called nationalistic, immediat ly drawing flak 
from China and South Korea. China summoned Japan’s ambassador to Beijing 
and expressed strong resentment over the approval of the textbook that “distorts 
history.”59 The South Korean government also summoned Japanese Ambassador 
Toshiyuki Takano to lodge a formal protest over the approval of the controversial 
history textbook.60  
                                                
58 People’s Daily, “Japanese Government Guilty of Drafting Comfort Women,” December 6th, 
2001 
59 Kyodo News, “Japan again OKs nationalist text, sex slavery glossed over,” April 5, 2005 
60 Japan Economic Newswire, “TokyoNow: Japanese textbooks trigger uproar in China, S. Korea,” 
April 10, 2005 
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Whitewashing history through Textbooks is a serious issue when we discuss 
Japan’s soft power in East Asia. Anti-Japanese protests that spre d through China 
in April 2005 are the latest manifestation of Japan’s distortion of history. The 
protests erupted after the formal approval by Japan’s Ministry of Education to 
print the textbook that glosses over Japanese war atrocities during its early 20th 
century history, and an estimated 10,000 to 20,000 Chinese demonstrators 
marched to the Japanese Embassy in Beijing, throwing stones at the f cility.61 
Chinese and South Koreans have also protested over Japan’s support for 
revisionist textbooks. Nevertheless, Japanese education specialist Fujoka 
Nobukatsu responded that many nations commit war crimes, and his concern is 
that Japanese children will be taught to hate their country.62 He believed that the 
aim of teaching history is to prepare people for citizenship, and they can’t teach 
them Japanese crimes, so Japanese have to make the choice to distor  history. 
Fujioka’s conception of education shows that it is framed exclusively within 
narrow nationalist limits. The Japanese government’s approval of a new version 
of a contentious history textbook for use at junior high schools has caused nti-
                                                
61 Power and Internet News Report. April 13th, 2005 
62  Davis McNeill 2005. “History Redux: Japan’s Textbook Battle Reignites” Japan Policy 
Research Institute Working Paper, No. 107 
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Japanese sentiment in China and South Korea with criticism that the textbook has 
distorted history. 
3. Koizumi’s continuing Yaskuni shrine visits 
Yasukuni Shrine is the Tokyo war memorial that honors 2.47 million wartime 
dead, including 14 Class-A war criminals. The former prime minister of Japan, 
Junichiro Koizumi, visits the Yasukuni Shrine and this is another factor that 
decreases Japan’s soft power in relation to Beijing and Seoul (See Figure 4.4). 
China and South Korea expressed their anger in fiercely worded statements and 
cancelled planned diplomatic meetings in 2005. China called off a scheduled 
ministerial meeting with Japan in what observers say is a protest against Japanese 
Prime Minister Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Earlier in December 
2005, China also cancelled a three-way summit with South Korea and Japan that 
was supposed to be held on the sidelines of the ASEAN+3 summit in Malaysia 
for the same reason.63 A three-way summit between Korea, China, and Japan, 
held every year since 1999 on the sidelines of the ASEAN+3 meeting, has been 
                                                
63 Arirang News, December 22, 2005 
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cancelled due to diplomatic tensions over Koizumi’s repeated visits to a 
controversial war shrine.64 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Do you support or oppose Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine? 
Source: Dong-A Ilbo, “Opinion Poll: Special Research on Chinese and Korean Attitudes 
toward Japan and Other Nations” Dates Conducted March 15-31, 2005 Released April 
26, 2005 This survey research was conducted as part of a joint research survey with 
Asahi Shimbun of Japan and The Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences (CASS). 
Korea and China have strongly protested against Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits, 
which have hurt Japan’s relations with them. Nevertheless, Koizumi said he had 
no intention of ending his visits to a controversial war shrine.65 The Kyodo News 
                                                
64 Chosun-ilbo, “Korea, China Cancel Regular Summit With Japan.” Dec 4, 2005 
65 Arirang News, “Koizumi Again Ignores Asian Criticism of Shrine Visits” December 1, 2005 
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Agency said the Yasukuni issue was not a diplomatic one, nor should it hinder 
economic and other exchanges between Japan and its neighbors. The Japanese 
leader said he believes his visits to the shrine would eventually be und rstood; 
however, it does not look likely. To China and Korea, Koizumi’s visits exemplify 
Tokyo’s failure to atone for its expansionist past. In sum, the Yasukuni visits have 
further cemented the widespread view that Japanese expressions of regret over the 
war are insincere, and decreased its soft power in East Asia. 
Where can we find the evidence that Japan’s insincere attitude over the past can 
have perceptible economic and political effects? First, the failure of Japan’s bid to 
win a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council—an ambition that no 
significant Asian nation supported, despite the billions in investment, is a good 
example. Second, the anti-Japanese riots in China in April 2005 triggered sharp 
falls on the Tokyo stock market. Japanese companies have been reassessing th ir 
strategies for investment in China, and many are already relocating factories to 
countries viewed as less politically sensitive. Japanese business leaders had 
lobbied Koizumi vigorously to stay away from Yasukuni, for the sake of go d 
relations with China—a sign of how high the stakes are for them.66 Third, after 
                                                
66 Caryl 2005 
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Koizumi’s Yaskuni shrine visits, Beijing and Seoul expressed their anger in 
fiercely worded statements and cancelled planned diplomatic meetings, in 
December 2005. 
Soft power contributes to the nation’s ability to achieve its goals. Despite the size 
of Japan’s contributions to the United Nations budget, Japan does not have a 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Japan’s campaign to join the Security 
Council is part of the country’s desire to increase its global power. And it was 
supported by the United States; however, it was not supported at the regional 
level, being opposed by China and South Korea. South Korea’s ambassador to the 
United Nations, Kim Sam Hoon said that there are difficulties for a country that 
does not have the trust of its neighboring countries because of a lack of reflection 
on the past to play the role of a world leader. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao also 
said that only a country that respects history, takes responsibility for history and 
wins over the trust of peoples in Asia and the world at large can take greater 
responsibilities in the international community.67 These examples show well that 
Japan’s insincere attitude over the past can have perceptible economi  and 
political effects in reality. 
                                                




Soft power contributes to the nation’s ability to achieve its goals. Japan’s 
insincere attitude about its war crimes decreases its soft power in East Asia. 
Japan’s new history textbooks that obscure its war crimes have caused serious 
concern among regional countries of a reviving Japanese nationalism. Its former 
prime minister’s continuing visits to the Yaskuni Shrine enrages its neighbor 
countries that were the victims of Japanese imperialism. Moreove , Japan’s 
insincere apology for administrating the system of military sex laves during 
World War II has worsened the relationship between Korea and Japan. In contrast 
to post-war Germany, Japan has consistently attempted to whitewash its past 
wrongdoings rather than to sincerely apologize for it. 
Soft power is the ability to shape what others want, and sometimes it can be 
reinforced or substituted for hard power.68 If you can produce the right outcomes 
by attracting others to want what you want, you do not need to spend on sticks 
which cost much more than carrots. Even under the situation that is only allowed 
to use carrots, Japan has not done a good job of reconstructing relationships with 
the East Asian states that were main victims of its aggression, and it has not been 
                                                
68 Joseph S. Nye, 2003. The Velvet Hegemon, Foreign Policy, (May), Issue 136. 
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trusted by its neighbor countries. This chapter showed that Japan has a limitation 
in its soft power in East Asia, and could not attract neighbor states du  to its 
insincere attitude about history. 
Global Level – Transnational Online Activism 
Are recent transnational social movements really new in a profound way when 
compared with previous ones? If the answer is yes, what is the newness? If not, 
why is that? How important is the new meaning of time and space, which new 
technology provides? 
Transnational online activism is a good example of the impact of the In ernet on 
global politics and how the concept and sources of power have been changed. In 
the sense that it is both “transnational” and “online”, transnational line activism 
presents the extension of actors and issue areas in global politics. 
The Internet is a new medium that is essential in almost every aspect of social, 
economic, and political arena. There is wide agreement that transnatio al ctivism 
has expanded dramatically in recent years, and the Internet has been changing the 
dynamic of the activism. But there is no agreement as to what extent and how the 
Internet has been changing the activism. To address this gap, this chapter explores 
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the impact of the Internet on global politics focusing on transnational line 
activism. 
“Rooted Cosmopolitan” vs. “Rootless Cosmopolitan” 
“Transnational activism does not resemble a swelling tide of history but is more 
like a series of waves that lap on an international beach, retreating repeatedly into 
domestic seas but leaving incremental changes on the shore.”69 
In Tarrow’s book, The New Transnational Activism, he argues that the most 
effective transnational activists are ‘rooted cosmopolitans’—people who grow up 
in and remain closely linked to domestic network and opportunities. According to 
him, “rooted cosmopolitans” are actors reaching beyond their borders but 
employing domestic resources, network, and opportunities. He claims that 
individuals who move into transnational activism are both constrained and 
supported by domestic network. 
This chapter prefers “rootless cosmopolitans”, “less rooted cosmopolitans” or 
“online rooted cosmopolitans,” to “rooted cosmopolitans” for the following 
                                                
69 Sidney Tarrow, 2005. p.219 
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reasons. Tarrow’s “rootedness” cannot explain activists who do not have any 
domestic resources, networks, and opportunities. The openness of the opportunity 
structure is different from state to state. The power structures and political 
cultures differ, too.  
Consider activists who do not have any local mobilizing opportunities, or 
resources under highly repressive regime. How can we analyze ‘rootless 
cosmopolitans’—the cosmopolitan actors who cannot have a root in the local, 
even if they want to? This chapter defines “rootless cosmopolitans”, “less rooted 
cosmopolitans” or “online rooted cosmopolitans,” as actors reaching beyond their 
borders and employing global rather than domestic resources, networks, and 
opportunities through the Internet. 
The openness of the opportunity structure is different from state to sta e. The 
power structures and political cultures differ, too. Think of human rights activists 
for refugees of North Korea. They do not seem to have any local mobilizing 
opportunities or resources under a highly repressive regime. How can we 
analyze”rootless cosmopolitan”—the cosmopolitan actors who cannot have a root 
in local, even if they want to? 
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Technological progress has played an important role in transnational activism. 
This fact can be applied not only to recent activism, but also to 18th and 19th 
century activism. As shown in Anderson’s “Panorama”, activists wereinspired by 
the great scientific breakthroughs of their day—the telegraph, the railroad, the 
industrial production.70 In the feminist history of the mid 19th century, activists 
knew one another, learned from each other, read the same books, and connected 
through conventions, periodicals, and correspondence. As Anderson suggested, 
technological progress made all the connections increasingly easier, nd the new 
inventions of the period facilitated the development of the internatio l social 
movement. The question here is how much the new meaning of time and space 
provided by the Internet matters in transnational activism. 
This chapter proposes that information technology as well as the multi-polar 
nature of the post-Cold War period play an important role in transnational 
activism. The creation of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN) is one international institution in the emerging realm which is 
not fully captured by the language of inter-state regimes or organizations as 
                                                
70 Bonnie S. Anderson 2000. “Panorama,” chapter 1 of Anderson, Joyous Greetings: The First 
International Women’s Movement, 1830-1860 (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 7-27 
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commonly used in the international relations literature.71 This chapter will try to 
demonstrate how the Internet offers new opportunities for transnational activism. 
Take the case of ICANN. What made ICANN possible? The effective use of 
internet in transnational activism made it possible to change the xisting domain 
name system (DNS) to ICANN. This chapter focuses on the creation process of 
ICANN, as the initial process of ICANN formation can show the impact of the 
Internet at the transnational level. “White Paper” produces produced by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce is a good starting point to analyze the creation process. 
“The original memorandum of understanding between the U.S. Department of 
Commerce and Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers” is 
another source for studying the formation process of ICANN. Most of all, 
websites of the related NGOs are important objects for analyzi g how effectively 
the Internet has been used in NGO activism, and how the use of the Internet 
influenced the creation of ICANN. 
                                                
71 Thomas Risse, “Transnational Governance and Legitimacy,” Paper presented at the ECPR 




Domain names are the familiar and easy-to-remember names for computers on the 
Internet, and the domain name system (DNS) translates internet nam s into the IP 
numbers needed for transmission of information across the network.72  The 
management of internet domain names and addresses has become a major issue in 
the question of internet governance.73 The government of United States played a 
crucial role in developing DNS, and this has become an important factor in 
studying the dynamics of transnational activism around ICANN.  
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is an 
internationally organized, non-profit corporation that has the responsibility of 
Internet Protocol (IP) address space allocation, protocol identifier assignment, 
generic (gTLD) and country code Top-Level Domain (ccTLD) name system 
management, and root server system management functions. These services were 
originally performed under U.S. Government contract by the Internet Assigned 
                                                
72 The U.S. Department of Commerce 1998. Management of Internet names and addresses (white 
paper). Federal Register 63(111), p. 2 
73 The Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School, 2000. The Debate over 




Numbers Authority (IANA) and other entities. ICANN now performs the IANA 
function.74 
In 1998, U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) released a “white pap r” policy 
statement on the administration of internet names and numbers, and DOC 
officially recognized ICANN as the organization that would inherit the 
responsibility for managing names and numbers.75 ICANN was created through 
the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the DOC and ICANN to 
transit the management of the DNS from the U.S. government to the global 
community.76 
In the mid 1990s, there have been increasing voices asking for change in DNS 
management. Particularly from 1994 to 1998, many debates and attempts were 
made to move internet administration into private hands. These attempts started 
with the Internet Society (ISOC) which was founded in 1992, and gradually 
expanded as other internet organization allied with it to carry out its agenda. As 
shown in the MOU, there were two key factors here: the full participa ion of the 
                                                
74 http://www.icann.org/general/ 
75 For more specific information about historical background on the formation of ICANN, see 
Milton Mueller 1999. “ICANN and Internet Governance: sorting through the debris of self-
regulation”Info, vol. 1, no. 6, (December), pp.497-520. 
76 From the fact sheet. http://www.icann.org/general/fact-sheet.html 
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international community and collaborative nature of the bottom-up policy 
development process. 
The Creation of ICANN 
Every social activism needs space to emerge and evolve, and the ICANN case can 
show that the Internet provides it. How was the management transition of DNS 
from U.S. government to ICANN generated? What made the global partici tion 
in internet management possible? What was the pressure for changing the existing 
system of managing the DNS? 
According to policy statement of DOC, there were six reasons t change the 
management of DNS as the Internet was rapidly becoming an international 
medium for commerce, education and communication. The pressures for change 
were coming from many different quarters: There was widespread dissatisfaction 
about the absence of competition in domain name registration; conflicts between 
trademark holders and domain name holders were becoming more common. 
Mechanisms for resolving these conflicts were expensive and cumbersome. Many 
commercial interests, staking their future on the successful growth of the Internet, 
were calling for a more formal and robust management structure, and an 
increasing percentage of internet users reside outside of the U.S.; these 
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stakeholders wanted to participate in internet coordination. As internet names 
increasingly held commercial value, the decision to add new top-level domains 
could not be made on an ad hoc basis by entities or individuals that are not 
formally accountable to the Internet community; as the Internet became 
commercial, it became less appropriate for U.S. research agencies to direct and 
fund these functions.77 
ICANN’s creation was accompanied by an active internet user moveent through 
a website. Online users participated in it and asserted digital rights so that they 
could have a voice in decisions affecting DNS. According to Hans Klein who 
serves as chair of Computer Professionals for social responsibility (CPSR), there 
were two coalitions, which can be labeled the “e-commerce community” a d the 
“pro-democracy movement”.78 The e-commerce community consisted mainly of 
four groups: the engineering research community based in Internet Society; 
multinational information technology firms such as IBM, MCIWorldcom; 
trademark interest groups such as World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO); the U.S. Department of Commerce. Opposing these groups was the pro-
                                                
77 United States Department of Commerce, Docket Number: 980212036-8146-02, Statement of 
Policy “Management of Internet Names and Addresses” 
78 Hans Klein 2001. “The Pro-Democracy Movement in ICANN”, p. 4 
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democracy movement consisting of many internet user groups, free speech 
organizations and a number of distinguished individuals in technology and policy
community. Pro-democracy movements wanted the U.S. government to give up 
its authority over the Internet, and wanted to ensure that internet governance 
would be transparent, accountable, and representative. 
Then, how was the Internet used in this debate? Transnational activism around 
ICANN conducted much of its work online. As an active participant, Hans Klein 
provided for multiple email discussion groups to allow for intensive online 
interaction, and through the Internet, individuals from around the world could 
maintain regular communication. In the creation process of ICANN, the work on 
the part of the advisory committee shows how the Internet was well us d in its 
decision making process. The work of the advisory committee was open and 
inclusive of all members of the Internet community.  Drafts and final 
recommendations were posted on the website, and suggestions and comments via 
the Internet were invited from interested parties. Some of the work of the 
committee was conducted over the phone, but most of it was online.79 
                                                
79 5 November, 1998 “ICANN Membership Advisory Committee - Expressions of Interest Sought 
by 5 December, 1998” http://www.icann.org/announcements/index-1998.htm 
 93 
 
ICANN election process is another good example for active NGO participation 
through effective use of the Internet. Elections for the board of directors were held 
in 2000, and the entire election was held online. Anyone processing an email 
address was allowed to participate. This is meaningful in a sense that it allows 
more grassroot participation than existing international organizations. 
Transnational online activism around ICANN was very effective in its use of 
internet. Indeed, it is a fully online movement, and well explained as a collective 
network. The activism for the creation of ICANN was a decentralized network 
with no hierarchical control. Underlying organizational features of the activism, 
the Internet has capability to allow people around the world to communicate 
across time and space. Online activism around ICANN would be totally 
nonexistent, and would not have been successful without capabilities the Internet 
provides. 
The Internet in Transnational Online Activism 
In dealing with the Internet impact, it is necessary to be cautious because the 
Internet does not have any filtering functions compared to the existing mass 
media. A great deal of uncertainties exists regarding the validity of online 
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information because much of the information on the Internet is often unreliable. 
Quality is always just as, if not more, important as quality. 
The Internet promotes active participation. Ayres argued that the In ernet, which 
includes websites and e-mail, is promoting a revolution in both the means of 
communication and the dynamics of popular contention.80  The rapid 
dissemination of information across borders has changed the nature and process 
of contention. Also, the opportunity structure has expanded beyond borders, 
physical boundaries.81 
Many websites dedicated to transnational movements present a variety of options, 
including posting messages on a discussion board, joining a bulletin board to 
receive updated information on a campaign or new event through an email 
account, sending emails to politicians, government agencies, or other acivists, 
and searching related links for additional information related to various 
movements. With these abilities, the Internet removes barriers to the rapid 
diffusion of protest ideas, tactics and strategies. 
                                                
80 Jeffrey M. Ayres 1999. “From the Streets to the Inter et: The Cyber-Diffusion of Contention” 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 566. (November), p. 133 
81 Ayres 1999, p. 137 
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The Internet is an interactive medium and requires less cost. In the past, 
interaction was very difficult to achieve through mass media. But with the advent 
of the Internet, as a new information communication technology, most 
transnational activism could gain social interactions not restricted by time and 
space. 
Traditionally, protests relied heavily on individual leadership; however, the 
Internet is altering this dynamic by electronically promoting the diffusion of 
protest ideas and tactics sufficiently and quickly across the globe.82 The Internet is 
a horizontal media, not vertical in the exchange of information, and has bottom-up 
processes whereas conventional media has unilateral hierarchical pro esses. Thus, 
the Internet offers an environment where communications can be processed and 
linked to each other with less cost beyond borders. The Internet is a new tool for 
bottom-up communication and grassroots campaigning.83 
As we can see through NGO activism around ICANN, email enabls an effective 
communication network through the Internet. The exchange of email messages is 
certainly a substitute for many traditional cumbersome calls, mailing, and 
                                                
82 Jeffrey M. Ayres 1999. “From the Streets to the Inter et: The Cyber-Diffusion of Contention” 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 566. (November), p. 132 
83 Hans Geser, 2001. On the functions and consequences of the Internet for social movements and 
voluntary associations. Online Publications. http://socio.ch/movpar/t_hgeser3.htm, p. 1 
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meetings. It reaches many possible participants in very different places and time. 
While physical meetings have practical limitations, online communications can 
occur with relatively less restrictions. The Internet allows a new way of active 
participation by sitting in front of the computer. In contrast to mst traditional 
forms of activism, which most often were restricted to people living in well-
populated cities, online communication opens up a wide various forms of 
“electronic civil disobedience” accessible to every online user anytime and 
anywhere in the world.84 
The Internet has provided a new opportunity for emerging transnational activism. 
It has expanded time and space, and supports transnational networking. It also
promotes the emergence of transnational activism from the grassroots level 
because it has decentralized as well as informal procedures which can start and 
develop transnational activism relatively easily. The Internet has enabled active 
participation beyond borders. Building communication networks and using 
resources are also easily possible through the online. 
                                                
84 Hans Geser, 2001. On the functions and consequences of the Internet for social movements and 





Without the Internet, the creation of ICANN would not have been possible 
because the activism around ICANN would never have been successful without it. 
The transnational activism was very effective in its use of internet, and overall it 
was fully an online movement. The Internet has capabilities that allow people 
around the world to communicate across time and space, and it promotes activ  
participation. In summary, the Internet has created a new opportunity for 
interactive participation across time and space with less cost. 
This chapter argued that the effective use of the Internet in transnational activism 
made it possible to change the existing domain name system (DNS), and to create 
ICANN. While there is a wide agreement that the creation of ICANN was an 
unprecedented experiment, there have been also many criticisms on the ICANN 
after its creation that ICANN has failed on all charges.85 The transnational 
activism around ICANN as well as ICANN itself is evolving process, and still 
opens to various possibilities. 
                                                
85 From “Testimony of the Domain Name Rights Coalition and Computer Professionals for Social 
Responsibility” source: http://www.cpsr.org 
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Chapter 5. The Information Haves and the Have-nots 
This chapter discusses the “digital divide” from global dimension based on 
communication theories, such as diffusion of innovations theory, knowledge gap 
hypothesis, and structuration theory. It discusses the main reasons for the 
information inequalities between information-rich countries and information-poor 
countries, the role of socioeconomic development, and what can be done to 
reduce information poverty and to bridge the global digital divide, focusing on the 
role of government and international organizations such as the U.N. or World 
Bank. 
Despite various definitions of the term, digital divide is commonly used to 
indicate unequal access and use of the Internet. The term, digital v de, is used to 
describe the discrepancy between people who have access to and the resources to 
use new information and communication tools, such as the Internet, and people 
who do not have the resources and access to the technology. The term also 
describes the discrepancy between those who have the skills, knowledge an  
abilities to use the technologies and those who do not. The digital dividecan xist 
between those living in rural areas and those living in urban areas, b tween the 
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educated and uneducated, between economic classes, and on a global scale 
between more and less industrially developed nations.86 
The Internet is a new media; however, there is nothing new about the inequality 
between information haves and have-nots. There have been numerous studies on 
information inequality in the past. From the late 1970s to the early 1980s, 
researches on global information flow from the North to the South have focused 
on the inequality of information flow around UNESCO's New World Information 
communication Order (NWICO). 
The debate on the new information order meant a conflict between th  
information-rich countries and the information-poor countries. The former, 
developed world, supported the free flow of information and existing 
communication order, while the developing or underdeveloped world emphasized 
the imbalances both in quantity and quality of the free information flow. To the 
poor countries, the free flow of information meant a one-way flow of information. 
The Internet has changed social, economic, and political lives at unprecedented 
speed. Internet diffusion continues throughout the world; however, its uses wid ly
vary depending on socioeconomic, cultural and political environments. As 
                                                
86 http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/D/digital_divide.html  
 100 
 
information can turn into social, economic, and political power, the asymmetries 
of information acquisition have a direct impact on people’s everyday life. Figure 
5.1 shows great disparities in the flow of information and the access to the 
Internet on the global level. 
 
Figure 5.1 The Atlas of Cyberspace 
Source: http://www.cybergeography.org/atlas/atlas.html (2005) 
The Internet provides limitless information at high speed, but only t those who 
can afford it. In order to get the potential benefits of the Interne , basic access is 
required. In poorer societies, how realistic is this? Table 5.1 and Figure 5.2 show 
how the regional disparities are marked. There exists a danger that poorer 
 101 
 
societies can become poorer, increasingly marginalized at the periphery of 
communication networks.  
























Africa  975,330,899 4,514,400 54,171,500 5.6 % 1,100.0 % 3.4 % 
Asia 3,780,819,792 114,304,000 657,170,816 17.4 % 474.9 % 41.2 % 
Europe 803,903,540 105,096,093 393,373,398 48.9 % 274.3 % 24.6 % 
Middle East 196,767,614 3,284,800 45,861,346 23.3 % 1,296.2 % 2.9 % 
North 
America 
337,572,949 108,096,800 251,290,489 74.4 % 132.5 % 15.7 % 
Latin 
America/      
Caribbean 
581,249,892 18,068,919 173,619,140 29.9 % 860.9 % 10.9 % 
Oceania / 
Australia  
34,384,384 7,620,480 20,783,419 60.4 % 172.7 % 1.3 % 
WORLD 
TOTAL  
6,710,029,070 360,985,492 1,596,270,108 23.8 % 342.2 % 100.0 % 
NOTES: (1) Internet Usage and World Population Statistics are for March 31, 2009. (2) 
CLICK on each world region name for detailed regional usage information. (3) Demographic 
(Population) numbers are based on data from the US Census Bureau . (4) Internet usage 
information comes from data published by Nielsen Online, by the Int rnational 
Telecommunications Union, by GfK, local Regulators and other reliable sources. (5) For 
definitions, disclaimer, and navigation help, please refer to the Site Surfing Guide. (6) 
Information in this site may be cited, giving the due credit to www.internetworldstats.com. 





Figure 5.2 World Internet Penetration Rates by Geographic Regions 
Diffusion of Innovations Theory 
Some scholars believe that the information technologies would eventually spread 
out around the globe, just like television, radios and telephone. Compaine argues
that the nature of the marketplace dynamics will eventually close the information 
gaps without interference from policy-makers. He presents evidence that the gaps 
are rapidly closing without substantive public policy initiatives and spending.87 
Despite the fact that he still points out some gaps that are pres nt, Compaine 
                                                
87 Compaine, 2001. 
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emphasizes the decreases in the cost of computers and the Internet services in 
recent years, as well as the increases in the number of minority groups online. His 
argument leads to the conclusion that digital divide is a natural progression of the 
market and will resolve itself over time. 
An important flaw in these arguments is found in many aspects. Firt, even 
telephones, the very basic communication devices, are not provided to the p or 
people in underdeveloped countries (see Table 5.3). Does this table support 
diffusion of innovations theory? No.  
Figure 5.3 Main Telephone Lines per 100 inhabitants, 1994-2006 




Second, the nature of the Internet does not support the idea of the divide resolving 
itself over time. The Internet is not the same as previous communication media. 
While the telephone is an interpersonal communication, and television and radio 
are mass communication, the Internet is both mass and interpersonal 
communication. Contrary to telephones, radio and television, information 
technologies allow for increasingly complex tasks, requiring a cumulative set of 
sophisticated digital skills. The emergence of the Internet has offered an unlimited 
space to share information, exchange messages, and store files. E-mail also has 
allowed new forms of interpersonal communication and network formation. 
There are views that the rapid evolution of technology may serve to increase 
existing information gaps.88 They argue that the speed of information technology 
development creates situations in which those who are limited to a very basic 
level of skills will be outpaced by those who are ahead in the ability to select and 
process information. These arguments can be seen as related to the arguments 
about knowledge gap hypothesis. 
                                                
88 Rogers 1986; Van Dijk 1999 
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Knowledge Gap Hypotheses 
There is a generally supported hypothesis about the information gap, which is 
“knowledge gap hypothesis.” Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien introduced the 
knowledge gap hypothesis in 1970. They argued that as the infusion of mass 
media information into a social system increases, segments of the population with 
higher socioeconomic status tend to acquire this information at a faster r te than 
the lower segments, so that the gap in knowledge between these segments tends to 
increase rather than decrease.89  
This hypothesis can be adapted to new media, both in terms of the access to and 
the use of the Internet. See Figure 5.4 and 5.5.  
        Figure 5.4 Knowledge Gap Hypothesis  
                                                









Figure 5.5 Information Gap hypothesis 
These two figures show the possibility of new communication technologies 
creating new information gaps before old gaps can close. This view indicates that 
new communication media increase information inequalities, not only becaus  of 
unequal access but also because of unequal use which is linked to socioeconomic 
differences. According to Bimber and Norris, the use of the political resources on 
the web tend to reach those who are already most engaged, reinforcing the r 
resources, but not reaching the part of the polity that other forms of political 
communication fail to meet.90 
The development of new media technologies, particularly the Internet, courages 
the debate over the impact of new technologies on the knowledge gap. Although 
                                                




Lower socioeconomic status 
 




the concepts of digital divide and knowledge gap were often intertwined in 
research on the inequality issue, very few studies formally linked these two 
concepts. Some scholars argue that the Internet would reduce inequalty by 
lowering the cost of information, while other scholars suggest that the greatest 
benefits will accrue to the majority with higher socioeconomic status who can use 
the new media sooner and more productively than the lower status groups.91 On a 
global level, it seems true that people in lower socioeconomic status do not enjoy 
the benefits offered by the new technologies, due to the problem of inaccessibility 
to the Internet. 
Structuration Theories 
Structuration theory, proposed by Anthony Giddens in The Constitution of 
Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration, is an attempt to reconcile 
theoretical dichotomies between agency and structure, between subjective and 
objective, and between micro and macro perspectives. The approach does not 
focus on the individual actor or societal totality “but social practices ordered 
                                                
91 Anderson et al., 1995; DiMaggio et al., 2001 
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across space and time.”92 The theory of structuration, on which this dissertation 
stands, is closely related to constructivism in the theory of international relations. 
Giddens adopts a balanced position for social change including changing power, 
attempting to treat influences of structure and agency equally. The theory of 
structuration holds that human action is performed within the context of a pre-
existing social structure which is governed by a set of norms. Thi  means that 
human action is partly predetermined based on the varying contextual rules under 
which it performs. Structuration theory tries to avoid extremes of tructural or 
agent determinism. For Giddens, structures are rules and resources organized as 
properties of social systems. Based on structuration theory, society do s not exist 
as an entity externally given; rather, it is created and changed by interactions with 
human action. 
Structuration theory offers insight into the ways of how the Internet i fluences 
society. According to the theory, rules are created through social interaction and 
serve to govern the behaviors of the members of the society. 
People use technology to meet their needs, and the resources and rules they 
brought into the information technology context serve to shape the roles and rules 
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of the new interaction. This may serve to reproduce the existing power relations in 
the social system, or it opens up new opportunities for those previously without 
power and resources. According to structurational theorists, there should be equal 
opportunity to use these technologies.93  
The concerns of structurational theorists are presented by Castells in his 
arguments about network society.94 He argues that those who have the resources 
to effectively utilize information technology to network are the negotiators of a 
society, while those who do not are excluded from another opportunity for social 
influence. 
It is natural that early adopters of information technologies are more likely to 
have the most communication resources to change or reinforce practices of 
existing communication media. The early adapters use information and 
communication technologies to change social structures. In this process, those 
who have less structure access are likely to be left out of such structurational 
processes. 
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According to Keane, global media companies regulate public communicatio  
spheres and alter society by creating a space for the discussion of power 
controversies among millions of people.95 To him, the Internet is one such type of 
public sphere because it counts hundreds of millions of citizens among its users. 
Keane argues that the Internet has changed much of society because it llows 
citizens to move beyond the traditional idea of public sphere beyond geographical 
boundaries. Cyberspace, a new space of communication, is created by new 
communication technologies, and it provides much stimulation of change both at 
the national and global levels. 
The arguments made by structuration theorists are useful in understanding the 
societal implications of the digital divide. They contribute to the id a that the 
Internet has the power to influence networking, organize and make institutional 
changes, and is more than simply another medium of communication. 
Digital Divide 
This chapter uses the term digital divide to refer to disparities n access to and 
usage of the Internet among nations, and examines “digital divide” from a global 
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perspective. What is a “digital divide”? Why does the “digital divide” matter? 
How is it different or similar with pre-existing traditional inequality issues? Why 
is it important to bridge the digital divide between the information-rich and 
information-poor? 
The term “digital divide” appears first from a national point of view in the 1995 
U.S. government report “Falling through the Net.”96  National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) reported that there 
is a persisting digital divide between the information haves and have-nots, 
between high income and low-income citizens, between college graduates and 
those without college degrees, between rural area and urban area, and between the 
races.  
Most digital divide research focuses on whether or not the information gaps exist 
and whether or not they are closing. Communication researchers also suggest that 
scholars should accept the reality that some gaps exist, rather than debating the 
demographics of access. Particularly at the national level, ten years of research by 
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NTIA shows that there are numerous gaps between those who possess and use 
interactive communication and information technology and those who do not.97 
Global information gaps in relation to the Internet communication, computer 
network usage, and new communication technology networks need to be further
explained because they also provide a base for explaining other socioeconomic or 
political transformations. The ability to form new social networks ha  provided 
the potential to reorganize existing social, economic and political conditions. 
Economic competitiveness and productivity are now measured by the ability to 
generate, process and manage information quickly.98 The global economy is 
electronically interconnected in ways that allow major economic activities to 
occur in cyberspace. The success of Amazon.com is a good example. The Internet 
connects geographically distant consumers together and increase efficiency and 
profit. The observation of Amazon.com indicates that usage of the Internet is at 
once offering economic benefits for individual users and also altering the nature 
of the economy. 
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One of the most significant areas of exploration in digital divide studies has been 
in the political benefits gained by the Internet users. While the exact nature of the 
Internet effects on politics are not yet proven, there are indications of many 
positive political benefits of the Internet usage, particularly concerning online 
campaigning in elections. The digital divide is argued by Johnson’s observation 
that “the Internet can give power to the less powerful, and it can increase the 
power of the already powerful. It all depends on who uses the Internet and 
how.”99  
Digital divide is not only a matter of technological access. It raises is ues of social 
networking, political actions, educational backgrounds, and economic status. 
Therefore, a long line of arguments have been made by communication scientists 
about the dangers of exclusion from new communication technology networks. 
Their work and theories can provide a useful tool for examining the possible long-
term social disadvantages for those who lag behind in the digital divide. 
Previous researches have shown that there exists a gap between individuals who 
have access to information via the Internet, and those who do not.100 And this gap 
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has resulted in a corresponding gap between the information-rich and the 
information-poor, the haves and the have-nots. This phenomenon has been 
described in literature as the digital divide. Studies on the digital divide mainly 
focused on the access to and the use of new media.101 Attewell categorized the 
digital divide into two levels. He labeled the access to the Internet the “first digital 
divide”, and the disparities in the Internet use “the second digital divide.” The 
first digital divide relate directly to material or physical access, while the second 
digital divide is related to non material skills, or educational back ground.102 
According to Norris, the concept of the digital divide encompasses thre levels.103 
First, the global divide refers to the divergence of the Internet access between 
industrialized and developing countries. Second, the social divide concerns th  
gap between information rich and poor in each nation. Third, the democratic 
divide signifies the disparities between those who do and do not use new media to 
engage, mobilize and participate in public life. 
Despite the attention to the digital divide, much contemporary debate over this 
issue remains mostly on the national level. Many scholars have expr ssed concern 
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about the inequalities of the Internet access and use by disadvantaged groups 
within one nation. There are many literatures concerning digital d vide at the 
national level; however, researches about global digital divide have been
relatively small and not systematic. Therefore, more systematic study from global 
level is needed. 
What Can Be Done 
The use of communication theories for explaining the implications of the digital 
divide in this chapter has drawn mainly on three of them: diffusion of i n vations 
theory; knowledge gap hypothesis; structurational theory. 
In global perspective, information gap between the information haves and have-
nots has existed continuously, and equal opportunity to access information is still 
needed. Because media diffusion largely depends on the free market echanism, 
capital concentration is connected to information concentration. In this 
perspective, information inequality is a profound and complex problem, and the 
debate on that is on-going. 
The importance of addressing the digital divide—the perceived gap between 
information haves and have-nots—comes from the multidimensional nature of th  
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problem, which entails significant potential socioeconomic and political 
implications. In the short term, there will remain significant gaps in access, so that 
certain people will lag behind. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, both technological determinism and social 
constructivism are not free from the problem of digital divide to explain the 
impact of internet. For technology determinism, digital divide is only a temporary 
problem, and it argues that eventually the digital divide will disappear. It is true 
that internet users are rapidly increasing; however, the existing gap between the 
information haves and have-nots will not be easily narrowed. Concerni g the 
digital divide, structuration theory provides insight into how the Internet 
influences society. 
The Internet is becoming an increasingly prominent medium of information. The 
Internet has the potential to enhance access to and use of information even for 
poorer nations, since the new technology offers better services at r latively cheap 
price. This means that the traditional barriers to get necessary info mation can be 
removed through the Internet’s ability to go beyond time and space. In a naïve, 
rosy scenario, the Internet promises many opportunities even to the people in 
under developed nations. 
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The Internet is still very much a communication medium for the industrialized 
world. Since new communication technologies require previous socioeconomic 
investments, they could widen the existing socioeconomic gap and informati n 
gap between haves and have-nots. 
There are many factors that have contributed to the digital divide. The structure of 
opportunities provided by public policy within each country, such as the 
regulation of telecommunications, or different cultural attitudes towards using 
computers may also contribute towards the differences. More importantly, 
different levels of socioeconomic development and education contribute to the 
digital divide problem. Access to the Internet is remarkably similar to the 
diffusion of other forms of information technology that have been available for 
decades, such as telephones and personal computers.104 
Kofi Annan calls for urgent action to bridge digital divide: “let us resolve to 
bridge the digital divide between countries, between rural and urban areas, 
between rich and poor, between educated and illiterate populations, and between 
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men and women.  And let us act urgently so that all the world’s people can benefit 
from the potential of the information communication technologies revolution.”105 
The World Bank has expressed growing concern that the Internet may leave many 
nations far behind, making inequalities deepen between advanced industrialized 
and developing societies and under developed world. The World Bank also 
attempted in many ways to reduce information poverty, and to bridge the 
technological gap between rich and poor nations. The global information gap is 
likely to widen the North-South divide without adequate action by governm nt 
and non-profits organizations. 
Whether the inequality in the access and the use of the Internet gadually 
decreases or expands over time will depend on how government, corporate, and 
international organizations’ efforts and investment in the public provide access for 
the information have-nots. The challenge in the information age is to maximize 
the potential benefits of the Internet worldwide before further inequalities arise. 





Chapter 6. North Korea: What the Internet Does Not 
Change 
“The Wind and the Sun were disputing which was the stronger. Suddenly they 
saw a traveler coming down the road, and the Sun said: ‘I see a way to decide our 
dispute. Whichever of us can cause that traveler to take off his cloak shall be 
regarded as the stronger. You begin.’ So the Sun retired behind a cloud, and the 
Wind began to blow as hard as it could upon the traveler. But the harder he blew 
the more closely did the traveler wrap his cloak round him, till at last the Wind 
had to give up in despair. Then the Sun came out and shone in all his glory upon 
the traveler, who soon found it too hot to walk with his cloak on.”(source: Aesop’s 
Fable, “The Wind and the Sun.”) 
Aesop’s fable of the Wind and the Sun suggests the analogy to Norh K rea that 
active engagement policy would draw North Korea out of its isolation better than 
a threatening approach of oppression. The Sunshine Policy, articulated by former 




The Sunshine Policy, emphasizing peaceful cooperation, resulted in two Korean 
summit meetings in Pyongyang in June 2000, which are historical moments in the 
Korean peninsula. There has been criticism that the Sunshine Policy ignores the 
fundamentally repressive and belligerent nature of North Korea, and in effect 
helps to sustain the Kim Jong-Il regime. In 2000, Kim Dae-Jung was a rded the 
Nobel Peace Prize thanks to the Sunshine Policy. 
The Sunshine Policy aimed at achieving peace with the basis of a trong security 
stance on the Korean peninsula through reconciliation and cooperation wi h the 
North. The South Korean government saw that a reunification will not be 
achieved in the near future, as the confrontation endured for more than half a
century. However, the South Korean government continues to believe that 
settlement of peace and coexistence is important. 
Soft power in North Korea 
Korea is the only divided nation in the world. There are two Koreas: the Republic 
of Korea (South Korea) and The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North 
Korea). South Korea and North Korea stand on two extremes concerning the 
impact of the Internet. Whereas South Korea is one of the most internet savvy 
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countries, North Korea is the least open to access and use of the Internet in the 
world. North Korea is one of the least globalized countries in the world. 
Regarding information technologies, naturally, it lags far behind South Korea, the 
world’s most wired country. Any international theory or communication theory 
which were explored in this dissertation, does not fully explain the reality of the 
Internet impact on North Korea.   
It is very interesting to discuss North Korea’s soft power because North Korea 
continuously pursues hard power such as military forces, instead of soft power. 
North Korea is widely considered to have a negative national image by the 
outside world, and is considered to be a de facto totalitarian dictatorship under 
Kim Jong-Il. Almost always, there has been a hard power problem at the center of 
North Korean issues. North Korea does not seem to be interested in soft power at 
all. North Korea, as well as Iran and Iraq, was labeled as an “Axis of Evil” by the 
former U.S. President George Bush in his 2002 State of the Union Address. 
Both in the Korean peninsula and in the East Asia region, hard power is still 
regarded more important than soft power. This chapter agrees that hard power 
really does matter more than soft power in the policy towards North Korea. 
Nevertheless, this chapter explores how soft power matters in the policy towards 
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North Korea, and how the Internet can potentially be used for improving the 
relationship between two Koreas and the U.S. This chapter assumes that the 
Internet will eventually be available in North Korea, and once it is used, it will 
change the politics of North Korea. One unanswered question here is when that 
will be. How to use the Internet for the better relationship between North Korea 
and South Korea is interesting. An analysis of the Internet impact on North Korea, 
South Korea, and the U.S. would make for interesting further studies.  
A major problem in discussing the Internet use in North Korea is that the actual 
statistics and other sources for research are very limited. For example, there are 
no basic data related to the Internet use. International Telecommunicatio  Union 
(ITU) does not have any statistics for North Korea, and the World Bank provides 
only data about telephone mainlines in North Korea. Overall, no official data yet 
exists on how many people in North Korea go online. 
The power of information to transform social, economic, and political systems is 
increasingly drawing scholarly attention both in the field of international relations 
and political communication. There is, however, only scant information in the 
existing literature on North Korea’s information technology. Indeed, little 
literature at all on North Korea exists, partly because it remains almost completely 
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isolated from the rest of the world. As a result, it is extremely difficult to get a 
clear picture of North Korea’s information technology. 
Access and Use of the Internet in North Korea 
The North Korean regime faces a profound dilemma about the development of 
information technology. Whereas the regime acknowledges the benefits which the 
new communication technology will bring, at the same time, the regime certainly 
has a great fear about losing its power to control the free flow of information and 
the Internet impact on its regime change.106 The free flow of information via the 
Internet will threaten the authoritarian regime. There is a possibility that the 
impact of the Internet will pose a serious challenge to the political regime of 
North Korea, and will result in its social and political changes, once unrestricted 
access and use of the Internet becomes permitted in North Korea. 
Therefore, the potential threat posed by the Internet has led the North Korean 
regime to adopt a two-way approach that encourages technological development 
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under the government’s strict control on the one hand, while it constrains people’s 
social, or political use of the Internet on the other hand. 
North Korea set up the website of Korean Central News Agency 
(http://www.kcna.co.jp) in 1997, which is the first website run by the North 
Korean government to serve as the propaganda outlet of the regime. Other major 
websites, such as “Naenara,” run by the North Korean regime show that the 
regime has become increasingly aware of the potential of the Internet as an 
economic tool as well as a useful instrument for propaganda. Naenara (“my 
country” in Korean, http://www.kcckp.net/en/) is the official web portal of North 
Korea, and its main purpose is to provide information related to politics, tourism, 
or history to the rest of the world, not to allow North Korean people to get 
information and communicate online.  The website contains mostly political 
propaganda. 
North Korean websites show that the government is clearly aware of the Internet’s 
potential political and social impact, and the government uses the websites for the 
purposes of political propaganda and economic development. The regime’s fear 
for the Internet’s social and political impact of information technology has 
continued to impede its progress.   
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The North Korean government has developed its information and communicatio  
technology since the 1990s. According to Asia Times, North Koreans also 
produce some of the software for mobile phones made by the South Korean 
company Samsung. In addition, North Korean computer experts have received 
training in China, Russia and India, and even in South Korea. But, inside North
Korea, access to email and websites via the Internet remains extrem ly limited. 
The main "intranet" service is provided by the Kwangmyong computer network, 
which includes a browser, an internal email program, newsgroups and asearch 
engine; however, most users are government agencies, research institutes, and 
educational organizations.107 
North Korea tries to make a limited use of the Internet to portray a better image to 
the other countries, or to promote foreign investment; however, it generally 
prohibits domestic access to the Internet and only depends on the intranet. 
Furthermore, intranet is not for the masses in North Korea, but for the privileged 
social elites. The regime has been able to improve its abilities of internet control 
through the experience of running the domestic Kwangmyong intranet, which as 
built in 2002 by the Central Information Agency for Science and Technology 
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(CIAST). This two-way approach is primarily the result of the regime’s 
perception that the Internet is both useful for its economy and potentially harmful 
for its regime. 
In North Korea, the government allows only a limited number of people t  have 
private telephones. It is hard to believe that the data on the acc ss rate of 
telephone mainline is the only statistic that international organizations, such as the 
World Bank or ITU, provide. The result, coming from the only available IT 
statistic about North Korea, shows very striking result because telephone 
mainlines per 100 people in North Korea increased from 2.2 in 2000 to 4.2 in 
2006.108 Compared to the telephone mainlines per 100 people during the same 
period, from 55.0 to 55.5 in South Korea, it is surprisingly low. It is estimated that 
very limited mobile services began in late 2002, but citizens werebanned from 
using mobile phones as of May 2004. North Korean government has complete 
control of print, radio and television media, and does not want to accept itizen’s 
use of the Internet. North Korea’s overall broadcasting and telecommunication 
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policies enable us to predict its internet policy. If technically possible, the North 
Korean regime will pursue absolute control over the Internet. 
Information Security 
Governments have recognized for a long time that controlling communications 
media can enhance their power. It is true that the Internet can rarely be controlled 
by its government with a great difficulty. But, it is also true that there is a space 
that even the Internet, a new communication technology, can be controlled by the 
government. For example, if you try to access the websites of North K rea in 
South Korea, it is not accessible. But if you try to access the sam  North Korean 
website in the U.S., then you can access it. Why does this happen? Under the 
South Korea government’s National Security Law (NSL), it is illegal to access 
North Korean websites. It is also most likely that some of the contents of the 
Internet are filtered by North Korean government agencies. 
Since the Korean War, national security has always been the top priority in Korea 
Politics and the ideology of national security is at the core of both S uth and 
North Korean politics. The National Security Law (NSL) was promulgated in 
1948, after the establishment of the Rhee Seung-Man government. The experience 
of the Korean War (1950-1953) has caused South Koreans to accept anti-
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communist ideology. This enables most Koreans to sacrifice their essential 
democratic values, such as freedom of expression and human rights, for the sake 
of national security. 
According to the annual report by the South Korea administration of justice, there 
were many detainees who violated the NSL and Anti-Communist Act under the 
military and authoritarian regimes, such as Park Jung-Hee and Chun Doo-
Hwan.109 The report supports that the military and authoritarian regime used the 
NSL and Anti-Communist Act violations a lot more than the democratic egime 
under Kim Dae-Jung. 
North Korea is uncomfortable with permitting their people to have ccess to a 
communication medium that can only be controlled by its government with great
difficulty. In North Korea, even much of the contents of television programs and 
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newspapers are censored under government authority. Therefore, it is natural that 
North Korea is very concerned with losing its abilities to control access to major 
sources of information because that can create great threats to its regime. New 
communication media, such as the Internet can be a challenge to the p wer of the 
national state, especially to North Korea. 
Political constraints have obviously prevented North Korea from technological 
progress.  If North Korea allows wide use of the Internet, the main purpose of it 
would be to have potential economic and technological benefits. Consequently, to 
maintain the regime security, the North Korean government seems to i plement 
restrictive policies to the social and political uses of the Interne by the people. 
Implications for Two Koreas and the U.S. 
The Internet changes politics and politics changes the Internet. In North Korea, 
politics has restricted the access and use of the Internet, and in South Korea, the 
use of the Internet has changed the politics. The Internet alone cannot bri g 
democracy. Even though the Internet has the potential to change existing pa tern 
of activities, the change depends on social, economic, political and cultural 
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conditions. Analyzing how the Internet can be integrated into different political 
milieu requires an understanding of the conditions under which it is used.110 
This chapter presented that the North Korean regime currently faces a profound 
dilemma about the development of information technology. While the regime 
acknowledges the benefits of the Internet media, the regime also has a great fears 
about losing its power to control information, since the free flow of inf rmation 
via the Internet will almost definitely threaten the authoritarian regime. Therefore, 
the potential threat posed by the Internet has made the North Korean regime adopt 
a two-way approach. On the one hand, the North Korean regime encourages 
technological development under the government’s strict control, and on the other 
hand, it constrains people’s social and political use of the Internet. 
In the long run, North Korea is likely to allow wider access to the Internet for 
economic reasons, but only when the regime makes sure that it can minimize the 
Internet’s political and social impact. Even after it allows wider access to the 
Internet, the regime will continue to implement strict internet regulations. 
Therefore, beyond using military might or economic sanctions imposed against 
North Korea, the U.S. and South Korean governments need to suggest to the 
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North Korean government the necessity of wider internet access. It would be 
helpful for both governments to persuade North Korea, showing that other 
regimes such as China have been able to take advantage of the Internet 
economically, while successfully minimizing its political impact. Using soft 
power costs much less than using hard power, and soft power approach will 
reduce the possibility the unwanted war in Korean peninsula. 
In the current North Korean context, the rapid social and political ch nges, 
coming from the impact of the Internet, is difficult to expect. Nevertheless, once 
the access and use of the Internet is allowed to its people, the Internet will 
eventually provide more opportunities for North Korean, despite the regime’s 
efforts to control the spread of ideas and information. 
 132 
 
Chapter 7. Conclusion 
Everything changes except the fact that everything changes. Indeed, the world 
always has been in a state of change, and our views on it also change when 
existing theories do not explain the change. The Internet is a new media that is 
essential in almost every aspect of social, economic, and political life. The 
Internet has been changing the dynamics of global politics; however, there has 
been no agreement as to what extent and how the Internet has been changi g it. 
To address this gap, this dissertation has proposed a study on the impact of the 
Internet on political power and the rise of soft power. 
While most of international relations studies has focused on the rise and fall of 
economic or military power, this dissertation has been interested in xploring the 
less studied, the other face of power, what is called “soft power.” This dissertation 
has examined how the Internet has been changing the dynamics of global politics 
by evaluating a classic notion of a traditional power concept, and by offering a 
new concept of political power. 
This dissertation has explored the power of information, and argued that the 
Internet brought three expansions in global politics: the concept of political power 
from hard to soft; actors from national to transnational; issue areas f om offline to 
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online. The Internet has changed power sources from material resourc  such as 
military or economic resources to non-material informational resources. Thus, this 
dissertation has presented how the Internet promotes the rise of soft power, and 
analyzed how soft power interacts with hard power in international relations. 
The theoretical foundation of this dissertation was provided in Chapter 2. It 
explored the nature of power, and examined the changing sources of power to 
gain a better understanding of political power in global politics. Thisdis ertation 
analyzed different power concepts from three approaches—realism, liberalism, 
and constructivism, and then analyzed Nye’s soft power. Soft power is “the ability 
to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion.” Based on Nye’s 
argument, successful states need not only hard and soft power, but also “smart 
power,” defined as the strategic combination of hard and soft power. 
Chapter 3 presented the Internet as a new media, and showed what isreally new 
about the Internet. Compared to traditional media, such as newspaper, radio, or 
television, the Internet is more interactive, flexible, and informative. The 
revolutionary nature of the Internet has been emphasized in this dissertation, 
rather than as a supplemental tool. At the same time, this dissertation has agreed 
with the social constructivists’ idea that there are other important existing factors 
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to determine the path of human development beyond technological developments. 
The access and the use of the technologies are often dependent on existing 
educational, socioeconomic and political backgrounds. 
Chapter 4 made both theoretical and empirical connections between the concept 
of power and the rise of soft power in the reality of global politics. It took a close 
look at the Internet as a new form of communication media with particular 
emphasis on the political use of it. How the Internet works as a political media on 
national, regional, and global levels was presented in Chapter 4. 
Cyber campaign in South Korea proved that the Internet is an effective tool for 
presidential election, and Roh, Moo-hyun’s effective use of it made a contribution 
to the election victory. The 2002 Korean presidential election reveal d how the 
Internet impacts national politics, and how it changes the concept of political 
power from offline to online. With the Internet, Roh tried to make his presidency 
more democratic, and to curtail the power of conservative newspapers, such as 
Chosun Il-bo. This made a sharp contrast with the Lee Myung-bak’s authoritarian 




Japan’s soft power in East Asia showed how soft power matters in achieving its 
national goals. The Internet has provided capabilities to transnational activists 
around the world to communicate across time and space. 
From a global perspective, information inequality between the information haves 
and have-nots has existed continuously and equal opportunity to access 
information is still needed. Chapter 5 discussed the “digital divide” on a global 
dimension based on communication theories–diffusion of innovations theory, 
knowledge gap hypothesis, and structuration theory. The importance of 
addressing the digital divide—the perceived gap between information haves and 
have-nots—comes from the multidimensional nature of the problem, which 
includes significant potential socioeconomic, political implications. Since new 
communication technologies require previous socioeconomic investments, they 
could widen the existing socioeconomic gap and information gap between the 
haves and the have-nots. 
Giddens adopts the balanced position for social change including changing power, 
attempting to treat influences of structure and agency equally. Based on 
structuration theory, whether the inequality in the access and the use of the 
Internet gradually decreases or expands over time, depends on how government, 
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corporate, and international organizations’ make an effort to provide public access 
for the information have-nots. The challenge in the information age is to 
maximize the potential benefits of the Internet worldwide before new inequalities 
emerge. 
Chapter 6 provides what the Internet does not change, with the example of North 
Korea, and implications for two Koreas and U.S. policy. Soft power is related to 
the Kim, Dae-jung’s “Sunshine policy,” which means active engagement of North 
Korea. Chapter 6 explored why soft power matters to the two Koreas, and how it 
can potentially work for North Korea. This chapter examined how North Korea’s 
views and policies on the Internet influenced the access and the use of it. This 
chapter argued that domestic political environments of North Korea do matter in 
the use of the Internet, and argued why it is important that South Korea and the 
U.S. makes efforts to promote the use of the Internet in North Korea. 
The North Korean regime currently faces a dilemma about the developm nt of 
information technology. While the regime acknowledges the benefits o  the 
Internet media, the regime certainly has a great fear about losing its power to 
control information, since the free flow of information via the Inter et will 
threaten the regime. In the long run, North Korea is likely to allw wider access 
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only when the regime makes sure that it can minimize the Internet’s political and 
social impact. 
In the current North Korean context, the rapid social and political ch nges, 
coming from the impact of the Internet, is difficult to predict. Nevertheless, once 
access and use of the Internet is available to its people, the Internet will eventually 
provide more opportunities for North Korea, despite the regime’s efforts t  
control the spread of ideas and information. 
In conclusion, this dissertation has sought to understand the political power of 
information in global politics. The Internet as a new communication media 
transformed the traditional concept of power, and promoted the rise of soft power. 
Information interacts with power. Power enables actors to get information, and 
information makes actors to get what they want. 
One of objectives in this dissertation was to improve theoretical understanding of 
information as a source of political power, and to show the change of actors from 
national to transnational, and the change of the issue areas from offline to online. 
Changes in communication media and information flow via the Internet beyond 
national borders resulted in significant political transformation. Therefore, this 
dissertation has focused on the Internet as a new media and the rise of soft power, 
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while it acknowledges traditional media is still powerful, and hard power still 
matters. 
This dissertation is an attempt to prove that information is a source of power. 
Information interacts with power. Power enables actors to get information, and 
information helps actors to get what they want. Understanding how infrmation is 
produced, communicated, and used is an essential part of understanding global 
politics. The Internet has created new opportunities across time and space. The 
challenge is to maximize the benefits of the Internet, and to minimize the cost of it 
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